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Abstract 
We argue that perceived fairness of the income generation process affects the association between 
income inequality and subjective well-being, and that there are systematic differences in this regard 
between countries that are characterized by a high or, respectively, low level of actual fairness. Using 
a simple model of individual labor market participation under uncertainty, we predict that high levels 
of perceived fairness cause higher levels of individual welfare, and lower support for income 
redistribution. Income inequality is predicted to have a more favorable impact on subjective well-
being for individuals with high fairness perceptions. This relationship is predicted to be stronger in 
societies that are characterized by low actual fairness. Using data on subjective well-being and a broad 
set of fairness measures from a pseudo micro-panel from the WVS over the 1990-2008 period, we find 
strong support for the negative (positive) association between fairness perceptions and the demand for 
more equal incomes (subjective well-being). We also find strong empirical support for the predicted 
differences in individual tolerance for income inequality, and the predicted influence of actual fairness. 
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Inequality is undoubtedly more readily borne, and 
affects the dignity of the person much less, if it is 
determined by impersonal forces than when it is 
due to design. 
Friedrich Hayek 
(1944: 117) 
 
1. Introduction 
Since Abba Lerner’s classic contributions from the 1930s, welfare economics has argued that 
income redistribution can increase overall welfare in a society with an unequal distribution of 
incomes, due to the decreasing returns to income caused by an assumed strict concavity of 
individual utility functions (Lerner, 1944). This view implies that most people in societies 
characterized by a highly skewed income distribution should, all other things being equal, be 
observed to experience lower levels of utility than those living in more equal societies. With 
the advent of the economics of happiness, it has become possible – and fashionable – to test 
this implication on individuals’ self-reported life satisfaction, which arguably proxies for the 
economic concept of ‘utility’.1 If Lerner’s implication – and indeed standard economic theory 
– holds, we would expect to see a clear negative association between income inequality and 
life satisfaction of the average person. Such empirical results would also be in line with the 
more recent theoretical model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), taking account of social (other-
regarding) preferences in individuals’ utility functions, equally predicting a negative 
relationship between inequality and happiness.  
Even though this straightforward microeconomic approach predicts that overall and 
average welfare in an economy decrease with income inequality, the empirical literature on 
the association between income inequality and happiness2 has yielded ambiguous findings.3 
                                                 
1 For an overview of the economic, sociological and psychological concepts of subjective well-being and validity 
studies on its alternative measures, see Diener et al. (2008), Fischer (2009a), and Veenhoven (2000).  
2 In this paper, we use the terms ‘happiness’, ‘subjective well-being’, and ‘well-being’ interchangeably. 
3 In a related field of research Clark, Frijters and Shields (2008), Layard, Mayraz and Nickell (2009), and Fischer 
and Torgler (2013) among others, use micro data to analyze income inequality effects through social 
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One of the first empirical contributions, Alesina et al. (2004), identify a negative association 
between income inequality and happiness for 12 European countries that remains statistically 
insignificant for most U.S. states. Explaining their results, the authors hypothesize that 
differences in perceived and actual social mobility exist between these two subsamples. 
Extending the sample to 30 OECD countries, Fischer (2009b) reports a negative association 
between individual life satisfaction and inequality in final income, but not for market-
generated income inequality – potentially indicating that it is actual consumption on which 
social comparisons are based. 4  In a world sample, however, the large-scale robustness 
analysis in Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008) suggests that the skewedness of the income 
distribution does not, in general, directly affect individual happiness. 
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between inequality and happiness, 
extending previous research in two dimensions: First, we allow individuals’ subjective 
perceptions of ‘fairness’ attributed to the income-generating process to affect the association 
between life satisfaction and income inequality. Second, we allow for differences in the actual 
fairness of the income generation process across countries, expecting that these affect how 
fairness perceptions influence the inequality-happiness-relation. Indeed, Grosfeld and Senik 
(2009) show that in the transition country Poland, income inequality at first contributed 
positively to people’s happiness from 1992 to 1996, possibly because it was associated with 
given and perceived good economic opportunities (see also Hirschman and Rothschild, 1973). 
In contrast, in the later period from 1997 onwards, it affected people’s happiness negatively, 
possibly because lower actual social mobility mismatched with the high perceptions people 
still had. Alesina et al. (2004) already conjectured that inequality might affect people's 
happiness with specific values and specific views on social mobility within the same societies 
differently, even if inequality in general is not associated with happiness.  
We present a stylized theoretical model, which serves to illustrate our main arguments 
and allows us to derive some testable hypotheses. This model analyzes individual labor-
                                                                                                                                                        
comparisons where persons compare their income with a reference level. In our study, inequality rather refers to 
differences in absolute income across persons and the presence of redistributive government activities. 
4 This is in line with Hopkins’ (2008) ‘rivalry model in conspicuous consumption’ according to which income 
inequality increases individual utility under certain conditions (high income and consumption levels, and a dense 
income distribution), as greater incentives to compete in consumption are generated. 
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market participation on the extensive and the intensive margin, depending on expected (i.e., 
perceived) fairness of the income-generating process. In the model, a society is considered 
fairer the closer the relationship between individual effort and market outcome is. Actual 
fairness can therefore also be interpreted as a measure of social mobility, because with 
increasing objective fairness, inherited social status loses relevance. Our model allows 
systematic and persisting incongruences between actual and perceived fairness. The model 
predicts that persons with higher perceived fairness will, on average, experience higher levels 
of utility and be less in favor of income redistribution.  
We argue that in a society where the distribution of individual inherited starting 
positions is sufficiently skewed to the right (i.e., where relatively few individuals “are born 
with a silver spoon”), subjective fairness perceptions are the main driver of investments into 
effort on the labor market. Using a standard notion of status utility, we then show that 
individuals with high subjective fairness perceptions react more favorably to income 
inequality than those with low fairness perceptions. Finally, we demonstrate that the 
composition of the pool of individuals with high subjective fairness perceptions 
systematically differs between countries with high and low actual social mobility. In countries 
with high actual mobility, more individuals with low ex ante fairness perceptions who invest 
little into effort are surprised by higher than expected incomes, and thus correct their ex post 
fairness perceptions upward. In countries with low actual mobility, these positive surprises are 
fewer, and thus the pool of high fairness individuals is composed of individuals with, on 
average, higher incomes and higher subjective well-being. Somewhat paradoxically, via this 
mechanism high actual social mobility thus reduces the positive mediating effect that high 
subjective fairness perceptions have on the impact of inequality on life satisfaction.  
To explore the link between perceptions of fairness, social mobility, inequality, and 
happiness empirically we use data from the World Values Survey over the 1990-2008 period 
and estimate a happiness function. We employ standardized Gini coefficients to measure 
income inequality, different proxies for individuals’ perceived fairness of the income 
generating process, and the interactions of inequality with these proxies. The empirical 
analysis aims to explore whether and to what extent perceived fairness mediates the potential 
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effects of inequality, differentiating between countries with low and high actual social 
mobility. We also investigate the relation between fairness perceptions and the demand for 
redistribution, mediating the impact of fairness on life satisfaction. 
We find that persons who believe the income generating process in their society to be 
fair appear to be happier and demand less income equalization by (and redistribution from)  
the government. As predicted by the model, we also find strong empirical support for the 
more positive effect of inequality for individuals with high fairness perceptions in countries 
with unfavorable institutions hampering social mobility. Consistent with our model, for 
countries with high levels of actual intergenerational social mobility in terms of earnings – 
thus triggering a close relationship between individual effort and market outcomes – the 
effects of income inequality and fairness perceptions appear rather weak or disentangled in 
their interactions. The interaction results are corroborated in samples based on measures of 
actual mobility through the education system. 
Section 2 presents a literature review, and our stylized theoretical model motivating 
the empirical analysis. From the model we then derive testable hypotheses. We describe our 
data and methods in Section 3, while Section 4 presents the results. The final section 
concludes and discusses the implications of our findings. 
 
2. Happiness, inequality and fairness: Theory 
 
2.1. Preliminary considerations 
In 1944, Austrian economist and social philosopher Friedrich Hayek (1944: 88) argued “To 
produce the same results for different people, it is necessary to treat them differently. To give 
different people the same objective opportunities is not to give them the same subjective 
chances.” From this follows, as Hayek suggested, that forcing individuals’ outcomes to be 
identical and ‘fair’ implies treating people unequally, and, thus, ‘unfairly’. The relation 
between what could be termed ‘fairness’ or other moral judgments of processes and outcomes 
and social inequality is therefore far from simple and straightforward. 
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The treatment of ‘utility’ in economics literature, both by the empirical research on 
happiness as well as standard economic theory, has usually focused on pure outcomes and 
neglected social comparisons. Yet, individuals do not only derive satisfaction from outcomes, 
but probably compare themselves to others, and also enjoy ‘procedural utility’ (Veblen 1899, 
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Frey and Stutzer, 2005). If people gain the impression that processes 
affecting their own situation are ‘fair’, they are not only likely to directly derive procedural 
utility from that fact, but also tend to evaluate the outcomes of these processes differently than 
if their subjective perception of the process is that it is ‘unfair’. For example, most people 
strongly dislike losing games or sports matches, but the impact of a loss is much stronger if 
they have the – reasonable or unreasonable – impression that their opponent has not played by 
the rules. Similarly, Stutzer and Frey (2003) show that two-thirds of the beneficial effects of 
people’s influence in the political decision-making process is not through their impact on 
resulting policy outcomes, but through the procedural utility gained from participation and 
civic engagement. Experimental evidence tends to support Hayek’s broad argument: Recent 
economic experiments reveal that inequality in profits is the more tolerated (by otherwise 
generally inequity-averse individuals) the more the process leading to its generation was 
perceived as ‘fair’. Experimental research has even identified the corresponding neurological 
process in the reward center of the human brain (see Hopkins, 2008, for a summary).  
To sum up, economic experiments show that if the process of reaching an outcome has 
been fair, then subjects in general bear an adverse outcome more easily. In contrast to our 
study, the set-up of these experiments is fairly simple, allowing actual fairness of the process 
and perceived fairness of the distribution process to coincide. However, one decisive 
contribution of our paper is to draw conclusions differentiating between actual and perceived 
fairness, which may or may not overlap, reflecting more complex real-world characteristics, 
which do not allow individuals to objectively observe actual social mobility in their societies.5 
These theoretical and experimental arguments can be applied to individuals’ 
evaluations of the distribution of income in society. Their subjective evaluation of the 
outcome – the inequality of incomes – is likely to depend on their perceptions of the processes 
                                                 
5 Indeed, our model suggests that if perceived fairness is high and actual fairness has a corresponding level, the 
positive effect of inequality on subjective well-being rises with perceived fairness.  
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creating the distribution and their evaluations of the fairness of those processes. Such 
conjecture has already been made by Alesina et al. (2004) to explain the differential effect of 
income inequality on happiness of survey respondents in the United States compared to those 
in Western Europe. For a sample of 30 OECD countries in the WVS, Fischer (2009b) finds 
that in a socially mobile society (from the interviewees’ points of view) the negative effect of 
income inequality on well-being is mitigated, if not overcompensated for. Likewise, in 
economic laboratory experiments, Mitchell et al. (1993: 636) find that “inequality becomes 
more acceptable as people are better rewarded for their efforts,” which can be interpreted as 
an indication for a mediating effect of the fairness of the distribution process of ‘rewards’, i.e., 
wage incomes, on the relationship between inequality and happiness.  
In this paper, we define an income generating process as ‘fair’ if there is a direct link 
between own investment in human capital, on-the-job effort and individual economic 
outcome. The weaker this link becomes, i.e., the more the individual outcome depends on 
chance and at the same time is related to inherited starting positions, the less fair the income 
generating process is. This would also be the case if income differences were caused mainly 
by individual differences in innate talent or ability that cannot be compensated for by effort. 
Such initial endowments could also include inherited wealth. On the other hand, if 
individuals’ perceptions of society indicate that ‘someone’ – either individually or collectively 
(e.g., through political decision-making) – is responsible for the shape of the income 
distribution, moral judgments on fairness will arguably come to rest on a different foundation. 
The difference between actual (objective) and perceived (subjective) fairness in the 
income generation process is often not clearly recognized by the early theoretical and 
empirical literature on happiness or preferences for redistribution. Most studies implicitly – 
and in the case of Alesina et al. (2004) explicitly – assume that subjectively perceived and 
objectively existing fairness in society correspond perfectly. However, the empirical 
happiness analysis for 30 OECD countries by Fischer (2009b) suggests that perceived and 
actual social mobility in society are not necessarily strongly correlated. For this reason, we 
explicitly differentiate between actual and perceived fairness and put them in a systematic 
relation. In particular, we hypothesize that whether the happiness effects of income inequality 
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are aggravated or reduced by fairness perceptions for most of the population hinges on 
whether perceived and actual fairness coincide or diverge.  
Fairness perceptions can also be argued to diverge according to political convictions. 
Typically, left-wing parties place more weight on equity of outcomes (so-called ‘social 
justice’), while right-wing governments place more weight on efficiency and equality in 
opportunities. This is observed as voters’ definitions of fairness differ systematically between 
parties (Scott et al. 2001). Fundamental differences in fairness perceptions would thus suggest 
that left-wing voters are sensitive mainly to income inequality, but less to procedural fairness 
as a determinant of market income (see also the empirical test in Fischer 2009b). In contrast, 
right-wing voters have offsetting efficiency concerns, which lead them to focus more on 
equality of opportunities, and to accept the resulting income inequality more easily. From a 
conservative perspective, relatively large income differences might be seen as an indication 
that individuals who work hard receive their just desserts. Indeed, Alesina et al. (2004) find 
that left-wing voters are more concerned about income inequality than right-wing or centrist 
voters, both in Europe and the United States. We therefore employ the respondent’s political 
ideology as one proxy of her fairness perception. 
In the course of this analysis, we predict a negative relationship between fairness 
perceptions and the demand for income redistribution, which we also test against our data. 
The relation between social mobility (perceptions) and the preference for equal incomes has 
been analyzed in a few previous studies. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000), using Russian micro 
data, were the first to show that self-assessed expected own social mobility, or the belief of 
being on a rising income trajectory, leads to lower demand for redistribution. Corneo and 
Gruener (2002) present a ‘public values effect’ model concluding that “an individual who 
believes in the importance of personal hard work [for income] is expected to oppose 
redistribution” (ibidem: 86), preceding the similar arguments in Alesina et al. (2004). In 
Corneo and Gruener’s (2002) logit regressions, run with about 30 countries in various 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) waves on the question ‘Government should 
reduce inequality’, both generalized fairness perceptions and perceived past social mobility 
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reduce the demand for equalizing incomes.6 In contrast, persons reporting that ‘they would 
gain [from redistribution]’ are in favor of such government policy. Population preferences for 
and against redistribution are captured by country-fixed effects, an approach that we will 
follow below.  
A negative relationship between personal income and preferences for redistribution is 
not only shown in Corneo and Gruener (2002), but also by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). 
Using U.S. General Social Survey (GSS) data, the latter corroborate the negative relation 
between perceived equal opportunities, subjective income prospects, income, and a history of 
past social mobility, with a preference for income redistribution.7 Exploiting the longitudinal 
nature of their panel data, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) construct two objective measures of 
actual income prospects, at the individual and state level. They find both to be strongly 
negatively related to individual demand for more equal incomes. Contrasting results are 
reported in Clark and D’Angelo (2008) for the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) who 
identify a positive association between own experienced social mobility (‘having higher 
socio-economic status than parents’) and being in favor of having capped incomes, or state-
ownership, and being left-wing.8  
In the following, we develop a simple workhorse model, illustrating the potential 
impact of income inequality and fairness perceptions on individual well-being. 
 
 
2.2. The basic set-up of the model 
Following, among others, Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), we assume that reported 
subjective well-being or ‘happiness’ of an individual i is an increasing function of her 
instantaneous, directly unobservable utility where i is an error-term:  
                                                 
6 Fairness perceptions are measured by the question ‘hard work is the key [to success]’, while social mobility 
experience is captured by the variable ‘better off than father’.  
7  Preference for redistribution is measured by the question ‘Should government reduce income difference 
between rich and poor?’. Past history of social mobility is measured by ‘having a job prestige higher than 
father’s’, and subjective income prospects are proxied by ‘expect a better life’. Equal opportunities as source of 
economic success are approximated by the question ‘Get ahead: hard work’, while unequal opportunities are 
approximated with the statement ‘Get ahead: luck/help’. 
8 This study employs the measure ‘The government should place an upper limit on the amount of money that any 
one person can make’, which is not fully comparable to that used in previous empirical analyses.  
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(1)  
 
The error term reflects unobservable differences across individuals, such as different 
subjective interpretations of the ordinal scale on which individual well-being is reported. This 
assumption allows us to focus on standard economic utility considerations in the theoretical 
analysis, i.e., on the underlying economic forces that influence individual welfare.  
We assume that utility is concave in income  and that effort invested to earn income 
has a negative and quadratic direct effect on utility. 
(2)  
where 
(3)  
and is a status and identity utility which is explained in detail below. 
 
Income increases with effort according to the strictly concave function g. The 
parameter  is a society-wide fairness parameter. The closer its value is to one, the 
more reliable is the impact of individual effort on individual income. The value of this 
parameter is identical for all individuals. On the other hand,  is an idiosyncratic 
parameter reflecting, for example, the family background, or the place of birth of an 
individual, or access to personal networks that may be instrumental in generating incomes. In 
general,  captures anything in the personal background of an individual that may make it 
more difficult for her to earn an income based upon her own effort.  
We assume that the true value of  is unknown to the individual decision-makers. 
They can certainly observe the institutional framework of their society, but the web of formal 
and informal institutions that characterizes any modern society is generally complex enough 
to make any exact ex ante knowledge of the true value of  extremely unlikely. Every 
individual therefore bases her decisions on her own estimate , which denotes her perceived 
Wi  w(ui )  i
yi
ui  v(yi ) 12 ei
2 
yi  g(ei ) 1 1  1 i  

  [0,1]
i  [0,1]
i


˜ i
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fairness. 9  The idiosyncratic parameter  is assumed to be drawn randomly from an 
individual-specific distribution characterized by the continuous and unimodal pdf  with 
support . Let  denote the expected value of the idiosyncratic parameter for individual i. 
We assume that the distribution of  over the population is skewed to the right, and also 
unimodal. We further assume that all individuals know their own . They do, however, not 
observe the value of  that is eventually drawn. They only observe income and effort, but 
have no definitive knowledge about how much of the result is due to bad (good) institutions, 
or an (un-)lucky draw of the idiosyncratic parameter. Furthermore, we assume that  is 
inherited: Individuals from poorer families or worse neighborhoods are characterized by 
lower values of .10 However, even individuals from unfavorable backgrounds have a chance 
to draw a favorably high  from the distribution.  
The status and identity utility consists of two components 
(4)  yi  y* ˆi,  i  2 (yi  y) 
where  straightforwardly signifies a status utility, as a concave and strictly increasing 
function of the difference between individually realized and average income. We assume that 
(0)  0 . This follows a standard approach of assuming that individuals use some reference 
income to evaluate their own status (e.g., Ederer and Pattaconi 2010, Luttmer 2005). The first 
term   is the highest identity utility attainable by the individual. It is reduced according to a 
quadratic loss function, which has a simple economic interpretation. Benchmark income y* is 
the income that the individual would expect to be earned by an individual of her type ˆ  and 
given her fairness estimate  i , if she invests the optimal level of effort e*. In other words, it 
is the income expected from an individual of her type, given the perceived circumstances. If 
                                                 
9 Piketty (1995) has shown in a model where individual income is also determined by societal fairness and 
individual influences that differences in fairness estimations may prevail in an equilibrium with full Bayesian 
rationality. 
10 Note that there is emphatically no genetic inheritance assumed to be at work here. This approach simply 
captures the empirical regularity that individuals from low-income families often find it more difficult to rise into 
high-paying positions than those who already have a high-income background. In a utopian situation with 
completely fair institutions ( ), the impact of the idiosyncratic parameter  would be cancelled out 
completely.  
i
f i ( i )
0,1  ˆ i
ˆ i
ˆ i
i
ˆ i
ˆ i
i
 1 ˆ i
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her realized income yi  is less than this expectation, a disutility arises from the feeling of 
being an underachiever. If, on the other hand, it is higher, then a disutility arises out of the 
feeling of having an unfair advantage from having drawn a favorable value of i . Thus, the 
quadratic loss function measures if and how far the individual deviates from her peer group, 
given the perceived circumstances. In this respect, we follow a standard approach of 
integrating identity utility (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Georgiadis and Manning 2012, 
Casey and Dustmann 2010). 
We assume the following sequence of events: 1. Individuals decide on their level of 
effort by maximizing (2); 2. Their own income levels and the average income level of the 
population are revealed to the individuals; 3. Individuals may revise their ex ante fairness 
perceptions. 
Individuals choose effort in order to maximize their expected utility. We assume Nash 
behavior, i.e., individuals neglect the impact of their own choices on y* and y . 
(5) iiiiiiiiiie deeevf   
1
0
2
0
)~,ˆ,(
2
1)~,ˆ,()(max  
This directly leads to the first order condition  
 
(6) E v'(ei,ˆi ,  i ) '(ei ,ˆi,  i )  ei . 
  
2.3. Expected and actual utility, effort and reported happiness 
From (6), we can infer individually optimal effort levels as functions of the other model 
parameters: 
(7)     with     and  . 
Status utility leads individuals to increase their effort over the level they would choose 
without status competition, but this effect is tempered by the prospect to enjoy identity utility 
by conforming to one’s peer group. Since both the individual expected marginal productivity 
of effort and the expected peer group income strictly increase with iˆ , optimal individual 
effort is strictly increasing in this parameter.  
ei
*  ei* ˜ i, ˆ i  ei ˜ *  0 ei ˆ *  0
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Deriving an indirect utility function V from (2) and using the envelope theorem reveals 
that V i  0 , i.e., expected utility is increasing in . However, a range of actually realized 
individual utility levels in the population corresponds to any value of , each depending on 
the individually drawn value . How will i respond if ? The key 
to the answer is the identity utility term. At this point in time incomes are revealed and effort 
cannot be changed. But in order to reduce the value of the loss function in (4), the individual 
has a strong incentive to adjust her fairness perception. If , the individual will want to 
avoid the explanation of a lucky draw of i , which would imply free-riding to a higher than 
expected income, using, for example, good looks and personal networks. This unfavorable 
explanation can be avoided by increasing the assumed value of . Note that given (3), any 
higher than expected income can be individually explained by claiming i ˆ i  and adjusting 
the fairness perception upwards. This can even be rationalized by the individual, since she 
will be able to find individuals from her peer group who had a higher ex ante fairness 
perception, thus invested more effort, and realized a similar income without being surprised. 
As long as incomes are observable, but effort is not, the update of the fairness perception is 
not only a matter of self-justification, but also plausible. 
If , the opposite reaction is likely:  will be revised downward in an attempt to 
explain lower than expected individual incomes with unfavorable institutional circumstances. 
Note, however, that given (3), this may not in every case be entirely possible. The reason is an 
asymmetry: Completely fair institutions cancel out the impact of the idiosyncratic parameter. 
Thus, it is possible to explain any positive surprise with a sufficiently high fairness parameter. 
A value close to zero of the fairness parameter, on the other hand, implies that the 
idiosyncratic parameter has full impact. Thus, an individual with a realized value of i  very 
much below its expected value may not be able to completely cancel out the term of the loss 
function by assuming a low fairness parameter. Put differently, individuals who experience 
negative income surprises reduce the impact of the loss function to some extent by assuming 
an unfair institutional framework, but they may even then be left with a residual loss of 
identity utility.  
˜ i
˜ i
i
˜ i
˜ i
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In any event, the tendency to reduce a loss of identity utility by suitably adjusting 
one’s fairness perception implies an unambiguous relationship between fairness perception 
and individual welfare. This leads us to our first proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. We expect the relationship between subjective individual perceptions about 
the fairness of the market income generation process and individual welfare to be positive. 
 
 
2.4. Preferences for income redistribution and individual welfare 
Let there be a simple, redistributive tax and transfer system, which consists of a proportional 
income tax with rate t levied on labor income, and of a guaranteed transfer income  paid 
to those individuals who do not earn a market income.11 To keep matters simple, we assume 
that the government commands no screening technology that would allow it to distinguish 
between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. Individuals therefore compare expected 
utilities inside and outside the labor market, and participate only if the former exceeds the 
latter. Thus, for any given tax and transfer system  there exists a combination of low 
levels of  and  where the individually expected marginal productivity of effort is so small 
that the individual decides against labor market participation. In general, higher perceived 
fairness yields higher labor market participation rates even in groups who expect relatively 
lower values of . Redistribution is ex ante only in the interest of individuals who plan not to 
participate in the labor market.  
The relationship between fairness perceptions and preferences for redistribution is 
reinforced if we also allow for ex post adjustments of fairness perceptions as discussed above. 
Suppose the redistribution scheme is extended such that individuals who participate, but earn 
a surprisingly low income, are paid a transfer until they reach a net income of . Those 
benefiting from such a scheme would all be individuals with , who revise their fairness 
perceptions downward ex post. In other words, all transfer-recipients are characterized by low 
fairness perceptions: either because they already had them ex ante, and decided not to 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Harms and Zink (2003) for a survey of the political economy of income redistribution. 
yT (t)
t,yT (t) 
˜ i
i
yT
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participate in the labor market, or because they were disappointed by their individual market 
outcome and accordingly revised their fairness perception downwards ex post. This revision 
leads to an ex post fairness perception which lies below the ex ante threshold for labor market 
participation. However, any investments into effort are obviously sunk and cannot be 
retrieved. This leads us to introduce our second proposition:  
 
Proposition 2. The likelihood that a randomly drawn individual will have a preference for 
increased redistribution increases with a decreasing individual fairness perception. 
Therefore, a stronger preference for redistribution is also expected to be negatively 
correlated with individual welfare. 
 
 
2.5. Fairness, inequality and self-reported happiness 
Our model contains different mechanisms that yield income inequality. The ex post market 
income of individual i is 
 
(8) . 
 
First of all, income inequality generally stems from the idiosyncratic parameter. The 
larger the variance of  in the population, the larger the inequality of incomes ceteris paribus 
will be. This will normally also imply a large variance of , and thus of individually chosen 
effort levels. Similarly, a larger variance of individual beliefs  also eventually results in 
larger income inequality, through the establishment of a larger variety in the individual 
choices of effort levels, with any given distribution of idiosyncratic parameters. 
We have seen in the discussion leading to Proposition 1 that higher income levels are 
associated with higher fairness perceptions, both ex ante due to increased effort, and ex post 
due to revised fairness perceptions. In combination with the status utility term in (4), we 
immediately observe that individuals that benefit from increasing income inequality via a 
positive status utility are characterized by above-average incomes and thus relatively high 
yi
*  g ei*( ˜ i, ˆ i )  1 1  1i  
i
ˆ i
˜ i
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fairness perceptions. There may be individuals with a high value of ˆi  and a low fairness 
perception, whose high expected idiosyncratic parameter leads to a high effort and income 
level. However, if the distribution of ˆi  in the population is sufficiently skewed to the right, 
the number of these types of individuals will be small and dominated by those who are 
characterized by high incomes and high fairness perceptions. 
 
Proposition 3. If the fraction of individuals who are characterized by high expected values of 
the idiosyncratic parameter is sufficiently small, then those individuals who have high 
fairness perceptions will, on average, react more favorably to income inequality than 
individuals with low fairness perceptions. 
 
Finally, we look beyond fairness perceptions and consider the impact of actual fairness and 
income inequality on subjective well-being in different groups of the population. A higher 
value of the actual fairness parameter π reduces the impact of the idiosyncratic parameter on 
individual incomes. In the limiting case of perfect fairness, the impact of the latter parameter 
disappears completely, and there is a deterministic link between (differences in) individual 
effort and income (inequality). According to (3), this implies that all individuals with  i 1 
and a ˆi 1 will earn a higher than expected income, and accordingly increase their fairness 
perception ex post. This implies that all individuals who invest relatively little effort due to 
unfavorable ex ante expectations revise their fairness perceptions upward. These, however, 
are individuals who earn higher than expected but still relatively low absolute incomes, due to 
their low effort levels.  
Suppose, on the other hand, that actual fairness is very low. Then the only individuals 
who benefit from higher than expected incomes, and who update their fairness perception 
accordingly (and mistakenly), are those who draw a higher than expected value i ˆi . This 
implies that fewer individuals with low effort levels, and thus low absolute incomes, will 
increase their fairness perceptions than in the case of high actual fairness. 
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At the other end of the effort scale, we know that individuals who decide to invest high 
levels of effort must from the outset be characterized by a high value of ˆi  and/or  i . Given 
our assumption that the distribution of ˆi  is skewed to the right, most individuals who decide 
to invest high effort are characterized by high initial fairness perceptions. Hence, if we 
compare the pool of individuals with high fairness perceptions under high and low actual 
fairness, we expect its composition to differ under both regimes. With low actual fairness, 
relatively few positively surprised low-effort (and thus low-income) individuals enter the pool 
of high-fairness perception individuals. Thus, the average high-fairness individual benefits to 
a large extent from status utility and income inequality. With high actual fairness, more low-
effort and low-income individuals ex post enter the group of high-fairness individuals. With 
on average more low-income individuals in this group, the average positive effect of status 
utility (and income inequality) must decline. This leads us to 
 
Proposition 4. We expect the relatively positive effect of income inequality on individual 
welfare for individuals with high fairness perceptions to be smaller in economies that are 
characterized by high actual fairness, than those that are characterized by low actual 
fairness. 
 
 
3. Data and Method 
 
3.1. Data 
In order to empirically test Propositions 1 to 4, we employ data from the pooled second, third, 
fourth, and fifth waves of the World Values Survey, covering the years 1990-2008 (Inglehart 
et al. 2004). We follow the standard approach in the literature by using individuals’ responses 
to the question “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these 
days?” as a proxy for (remembered) utility and the dependent variable for Propositions 1 and 
4. The responses are distributed on a ten-point scale ranging from 1 (completely dissatisfied) 
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to 10 (completely satisfied), with a sample mean of about 6.3.12 In order to estimate a set of 
relevant personal characteristics forming the core of individuals’ happiness functions, we rely 
on the robust baseline model in Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008) and Fischer (2009c). 
We include country-fixed effects, wave-fixed effects, and their interactions, to control for any 
variables that do not vary within a country, over time, or are constant within a certain country 
and wave, and that might be correlated with our variables of interest. This extensive set of 
fixed effects minimizes the possible influences of omitted variables bias, given that we 
identify the effects of our variables of interest using variation at the individual level holding 
country-, period-, and country-period fixed effects constant. At the individual level, we 
include measures of age, gender, family type, religion, religiosity and spirituality, and age 
cohort effects.13 We also include measures of education, income and occupational status that, 
according to the theoretical model, mediate an individual’s subjective success probability 
(fairness perception). Table 2 excludes these variables so that we can assess the importance of 
this transmission channel. 
 Measures of vertical and horizontal trust (such as confidence in political institutions 
and trust in other people) are not part of the baseline model as they may be strongly correlated 
with perceived fairness and could thus be transmission channels for our variable of main 
interest.14 The baseline sample includes about 300’000 persons in more than 80 countries but, 
due to data availability, it is much smaller in most regressions, depending on the employed 
                                                 
12 The WVS includes questions on both life satisfaction and happiness, but the correlation between happiness 
and satisfaction is surprisingly low (rho = 0.44). We opt for using the life satisfaction question since: 1) 
translation problems seem to yield cross-country comparisons of answers to the other question less comparable 
and; 2) the happiness question is more likely to capture the affective component of subjective well-being rather 
than its cognitive component (for a discussion, see Fischer 2009a). 
13 Arguably, more optimistic people could be more likely to be happier and at the same time perceive fairness to 
be more prevalent. The 1990-wave of the World Value Survey contains two questions that relate to optimism, 
which we use to test for this possibility: (1) "I am good at getting what I want" and (2) "I usually count on being 
successful in everything I do." When we re-estimate all regressions using one of these two variables, 
respectively, our main results are not affected. We report these results in the Appendix Tables B.2. and 
B.3.While we are thus confident that our results are not due to the omission of optimism, other omitted 
individual-specific variables could bias our results, as in any comparable study. While we control for many 
individual-specific variables and address omitted variable bias at the country-level by our extensive set of fixed 
effects, a bullet-proof test of our theory would require an exogenous instrumental variable or "true" panel data. 
We unfortunately have neither of those. 
14 Note that the inclusion of a measure of horizontal trust does not alter the main results of our analysis however 
(e.g., in Tables 6 and 7), but does reduce the size of the regression samples. 
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fairness measure. The baseline results for the micro-level determinants of subjective well-
being (SWB) in the present sample are similar to those in Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer 
(2008) – they are reported in Column 1 of Table A1 in Appendix A, while Appendix B 
presents descriptive statistics.15 
 
Measures of self-report procedural fairness and demand for income redistribution 
Individuals’ fairness evaluations of income inequality are approximated using definitions of 
fairness in the income generation process in the labor market. They include measures of social 
mobility in the labor market such as whether hard work determines economic success. All 
fairness perception proxies are constructed as dichotomous variables, taking on the value ‘1’ 
if the respondent believes that procedural fairness is present in society, and ‘0’ if otherwise. 
These definitions of fairness perceptions have also been employed in previous studies such as 
Corneo and Gruener (2002) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). In addition, we approximate 
fairness perceptions by employing information on individual political self-positioning on a 
leftist-conservative scale, arguing that conservative persons favor fairness in the income 
generation process, while leftist-oriented persons are more outcome-oriented. Table 1 
provides an overview of the fairness perception measures included in this study. 
 
Table 1: Measures of fairness perceptions and income redistribution 
Variable name Definition 
Perceived fairness of the market income generation process 
Hard work brings 
success in the long 
run 
Dummy that is ‘1’ for values below 5 on the question ‘In the long 
run, hard work usually brings success’ (which has a 10-point scale) 
People are poor 
due to laziness, not 
injustice 
Dummy that is ‘1’ for individuals claiming ‘People are living in 
need because of laziness or lack of willpower’ and ‘0’ when 
answering ‘People are living in need because of injustice in society’ 
                                                 
15 For a detailed discussion of these results see Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008). 
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People have chance 
to escape poverty 
Dummy that is ‘1’ for individuals claiming that ‘people have a 
chance to escape poverty’ (alternative: ‘they have little chance’) 
General meritocratic worldview 
Conservative 
Ideology 
Dummy that is ‘1’ for values above or equal to 7 on a 10-point scale 
measuring conservative political ideology 
Demand for income redistribution 
More equal 
incomes 
Measures on a 10-point scale the redistribution preference according 
to the question “Incomes should be more equal” 
Elimination 
Measures the ‘importance of eliminating big income inequalities’ on 
a 5-point scale (ranging from ‘not at all important’ to ‘very 
important’) 
Basic needs 
Measures the ‘importance of guaranteeing basic needs’ on a 5-point 
scale (ranging from ‘not at all important’ to ‘very important’) 
 
 
 The demand for income redistribution is measured using three proxies derived from 
the World Values Survey. These variables resemble the measures of income redistribution 
through governments employed in Corneo and Gruener (2002) and Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2005) and are originally measured on a 10-point or, respectively, a 5-point scale. To facilitate 
the interpretation of the results, we recoded them so that higher values indicate a stronger 
preference for redistribution. Table 1 provides an overview of the variables employed and 
their exact codings. 
 
Measures of actual social mobility 
To test Proposition 4, we need a measure of actual social mobility. Researchers have applied 
different concepts to capture social mobility, which is a construct that is hard to grasp with a 
single number. Blanden (2011) provides an overview of the research that has been conducted 
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within economics and sociology and the strengths and weaknesses of the individual 
approaches. Broadly, the existing indicators can be grouped into two categories.  
Indicators in the first category measure intergenerational mobility in educational 
attainment. Causa et al. (2009) provide summary measures of persistence in both secondary 
and tertiary education for men and women in OECD countries based on the EU-Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (SILC) database. Hertz et al. (2007) rank 42 countries with 
regard to the relationship between years of education of parents and their children. Chevalier 
et al. (2009) also classify and rank countries based on the UNESCO-designed International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), though for a smaller sample of European 
countries and the USA. All of these measures are somehow comparable, and we employ all of 
them in our regressions. 
The second category contains measures that focus on the elasticity and persistence of 
income and wages across generations. Blanden (2013) provides estimates of income elasticity 
for 12 countries. Causa et al. (2009) also present estimates of intergenerational earnings 
elasticity, partly based on data from D’Addio (2007) and Corak (2006). In addition, they 
estimate wage persistence for men and women as the gap between an estimated wage if the 
individual’s father achieved tertiary education and when he only completed below upper 
secondary education. Again, these are based on the EU-SILC database. As above, we choose 
to employ all four measures to obtain a more complete picture.16 
A third option would have been to employ one of several composite indices intended 
to measure barriers to mobility, status persistence and social justice, such as the Fraser index 
of economic freedom or the Human Development Index. However, these all tend to suffer 
from the same kitchen-sink nature, namely that they de facto include more information on the 
level of economic development than what they are intended to measure (e.g., Cahill 2005). 
We thus refrain from using this type of measure. 
                                                 
16 The measures we use all measure economic outcomes of the social process within societies; other measures are 
more based on what we would like to call ‘potential social mobility’. Fischer (2009b) employs a measure of 
educational mobility based on the PISA 2003 Mathematics results and Causa and Chapuis (2009) calculate the 
influence of parental background on the overall performance in the 2006 PISA results. An earlier version of this 
paper (Bjørnskov, Dreher, Fischer and Schellenbach 2010) employed these measures yielding differing results. 
Possibly, countries fail to convert this mobility potential into real social mobility. 
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Measure of income inequality 
The Gini coefficients for testing Proposition 4 are obtained from the most recent version of 
the Standardized World Income Inequality Database developed by Solt (2009), as described 
above.17 We have chosen to obtain the Gini values from this specific database because the 
author undertook special care to use reliable, high-quality income information with the 
Luxembourg Income Study employed as the standard. Non-comparability of Gini coefficients 
across countries constituted a severe problem with alternative income inequality information, 
as stressed by Deininger and Squire (1996).18 The Solt data is available for 173 countries for a 
wide range of years between 1960 and 2010. As the Gini measure refers to the country level, 
its true effect obviously cannot be identified in our model due to its multicollinearity with the 
country-wave fixed effects. However, Proposition 4 can be tested by interacting our fairness 
measures with the Gini coefficient.  
 
 
3.2. Method 
Proposition 1 predicts a positive association of individual fairness perceptions (i.e., perceived 
fairness of individual i) with individual life satisfaction. To test Proposition 1, we add the four 
fairness perception measures to the baseline happiness model and observe their relationship 
with subjective well-being (SWBi = f(fairnessi, ...)). Vector includes theindividual-
level control variables, cohort effects, and the set of fixed effects as described above; ui is the 
                                                 
17 One could argue that the difference between Gini measures based on market and net disposable income could 
serve as a de facto measure of government redistribution. However, Bergh (2005) shows for 11 OECD countries 
with high quality national statistics systems that the difference between pre-transfer and post-transfer Gini 
coefficients is not a reliable measure of actual government redistribution. In particular, redistributive policy 
affects not only post-redistribution Ginis, but also market-income measures due to policy effects on the effort-
incentive central to our model. 
18 A separate problem, which a referee kindly pointed us to, is that income inequality does not translate directly 
into support for redistribution. As the WVS, which measures personal income in 10 categories, does not permit 
the construction of a measure of relative income distance, we cannot directly combine inequality aversion, 
perceptions and income status at the individual level. Recent indices such as that developed by Graham and 
Felton (2006) cannot be constructed from the WVS. In addition, for our purpose it would be a problem that a 
measure such as that proposed by Graham and Felton directly includes a component of inequality aversion, 
which is exactly what we want to test in the inequality-utility-regressions. 
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error term. Standard errors are clustered at the country-wave level. According to the 
theoretical model, in equilibrium, the effects of fairness perceptions should entirely run 
through own income, education and occupational status, which we therefore exclude from the 
vector  of the baseline specification. We test whether these variables are transmission 
channels for our main variables of interest and therefore also report specifications including 
them.  
 
(9) SWBi = 'fairnessi +'+ ui 
 
Proposition 2 predicts that perceiving the income generation process as fair reduces the 
demand for income redistribution, while demanding more redistribution itself is predicted to 
be negatively associated with subjective well-being. In other words, Proposition 2 views 
equation (9) as a reduced function of the chained function (SWBi = f (REDi (fairnessi ...) …)). 
We test this hypothesis at first by estimating a model of demand for income redistribution, 
with the identical variable of interest and the same set of control variables as in equation (9). 
The estimated coefficient ' indicates the effect of fairness perceptions on the probability to be 
in favor of redistribution: 
 
(10) Pr(RED)i= 'fairnessi '+ ui 
 
In a second step, we relate subjective well-being to the demand for redistribution, expecting a 
negative relationship: 
 
(11) SWBi = REDi '+ ui 
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To test Proposition 4, we add the interactions of those fairness perception questions with 
income inequality in their home country as measured by the Gini coefficient to equation (9), 
differentiating between countries with low and high actual social mobility.19 
 
(12) SWBi = fairnessi + fairnessiGINI '+ u  
 
In estimating the model of subjective well-being we follow the previous literature (see, e.g., 
Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer 2008), but employ OLS in which coefficient estimates also 
represent marginal effects, facilitating the interpretation of the interaction terms. This 
approach follows Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004), who show that OLS is a feasible 
estimation procedure for a 10-point categorical happiness variable by employing the 10-
category life satisfaction question in the German Socio-Economic Panel, the analogue of 
which we have obtained from the WVS.  
For equation (10), we estimate the model with OLS in order to facilitate the 
interpretation of the results, despite the categorical nature of the indices of preference for 
income redistribution (measured on a 5- or 10-point scale). Even though the analysis focuses 
on the direction of (significant) influences of the fairness perceptions estimates, we also 
discuss their relative quantitative effects. 
The next section reports the results. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Some basic correlations 
Prior to turning to the multivariate analysis it may be worthwhile to investigate a couple of 
simple correlations between individual life satisfaction and perceived and objective fairness, 
or, respectively, social mobility. 
                                                 
19 A potential problem with this data would arise if it simply proxied for individuals’ income positions. However, 
the responses are only weakly associated with individual incomes. 
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 Simple correlations between measures of fairness perceptions and individual life 
satisfaction are rather low or moderate, with coefficient values ranging between roughly 0.05 
(hard work) and 0.2 (chance to escape poverty). Correlations with measures of real social 
mobility are also small. For measures of wage and income persistence across generations they 
range from 0.04 for the income elasticity measure by Blanden (2013) to 0.13 for the measure 
of female wage persistence across generations in Causa et al. (2009). For measures that relate 
educational outcomes across generations, the correlation ranges from -0.07 for the 
intergenerational correlation of education from Hertz et al. (2007) to 0.1 for a measure of 
persistence in below upper secondary education from Causa et al. (2009), all in absolute 
terms. Finally, the correlation between gross income inequality and life satisfaction is 
positive, but fairly small (0.15).  
 In general, correlations of roughly 0.2 to 0.6 are achieved when an aggregate measure 
of happiness is employed in place of individual subjective well-being. Using the mean of life 
satisfaction in a country, the strength of the link between individual and parental earnings 
from D’Addio (2007) shows a correlation of about 0.5, and persistence in wages between 0.32 
and 0.59. Measures of educational persistence are correlated with the aggregated measure 
between 0.17 and 0.44. The gross Gini coefficients still show a correlation of 0.4 with country 
means in life satisfaction. Employing aggregated individual data on the four fairness 
perception measures, correlations with country means in life satisfaction range from -0.08 to 
0.37 and are, for at least two measures (chance to escape poverty and being politically 
conservative), quite large.  
 
 
4.2. Testing Proposition 1: Fairness perceptions and subjective well-being 
Table 2 tests Proposition 1 by including the proxies for perceived fairness to the baseline 
specification of the well-being model, one-by-one. Overall, Table 2 tests four fairness 
measures, yielding four model variants. The table displays only the estimation results for the 
fairness measure and the number of individual observations in the corresponding regression 
samples; the full model estimations are displayed in the Appendix (Table A1, columns 2 - 5). 
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The constant in the regressions is in most cases around 8 SWB points (not reported), and the 
adjusted R2 ranges between 0.2 and 0.25, depending on the model specification.20  
 
Table 2: Relations between happiness and fairness perceptions 
 
 
Notes: OLS estimations. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. Cluster adjusted standard errors in parentheses. 
All models include the baseline micro-variables, and interacted country- and wave-fixed effects (not reported). Income, education and 
occupational status are excluded from the model. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. The countries 
included in each regression sample are presented in Table D3 of the Appendix. 
 
First, note the positive signs of the perceived-fairness estimates, which indicate that 
persons with high fairness perceptions are indeed happier on average. As all four fairness 
estimates are significant at the 1 percent level, the results are clearly in line with Proposition 
1. The quantitative impact of these variables is considerable, with coefficients ranging 
between 0.25 (hard work) and 0.51 (laziness). Comparing these effects with those of other 
determinants of subjective well-being as reported in the Appendix (Tables A1 and A2) shows 
that these effects are comparable with, for example, taking part in religious service once a 
month as compared to never (0.18) or being married as compared to being divorced or 
separated (0.67). According to Table A2 in the Appendix, the largest associations of about 
half a life satisfaction category are observable for labor market mobility perceptions (‘people 
are poor due to laziness’ and ‘people have a chance to escape poverty’) and ‘conservative 
ideology’. Further investigation shows that these relative differences across fairness 
                                                 
20 The constant can be interpreted as the baseline SWB level of the reference group, which, in this specification, 
has low fairness perceptions, is male, has no children, is religious but not affiliated to a major religion, is 
divorced or separated from her partner, does not believe in a superior being, and never attends religious service.  
Dependent variable: Life Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hard work brings success in the long run 0.248***
[0.017]
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice 0.418***
[0.031]
People have chance to escape poverty 0.510***
[0.056]
Conservative ideology 0.351***
[0.022]
Observations 180,985 136,683 63,880 291,305
R‐squared 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.22
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perception coefficients are not caused by changes in sample sizes across regressions (not 
reported). In summary, our empirical results are in line with Proposition 1, suggesting that 
persons who perceive the income generation process as fair experience higher levels of 
subjective well-being. 
According to our model, perceived social mobility should have a positive impact on 
individual human capital investments, expected life-time earnings and occupational status in 
equilibrium, with perceived social mobility affecting subjective well-being through these 
transmission channels. As our next step, we therefore test the same empirical model 
specification, but include measures of education, income, and occupational status. Table 3 
reports the results and shows analogously to Table 2 that persons who perceive themselves as 
living in a fair society experience higher levels of subjective well-being. In line with our 
model, persons with higher income or better education are happier (for full estimation results, 
again see the Appendix Table A2). Comparing the fairness perception estimates across 
models (Tables 2 and 3), we observe for all four fairness perception measures smaller 
coefficient sizes in Table 3, with all differences being statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. Thus, while the fairness measures remain significant and sizable, the SWB effects of 
fairness and social mobility perceptions are partly mediated through own human capital 
investment. This finding is again in line with our model predictions.  
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Table 3: Relations between happiness and fairness perceptions –  
testing the transmission channels income, occupation and education 
 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. Cluster adjusted standard errors in parentheses. 
All models include the baseline micro-variables, income, education and occupational status, and interacted country- and wave- fixed effects 
(not reported). *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. The countries included in each regression sample 
are presented in Table D3 of the Appendix. 
 
 
4.3. Testing Proposition 2: Fairness perception, demand for redistribution, and subjective 
well-being 
Table 4 tests the prediction of Proposition 2 that persons who perceive the income generating 
process as fair have a lower demand for equalizing the income distribution through 
redistribution from the rich to the poor. We estimate OLS models for the four fairness 
perception variables employed in the happiness models (Proposition 1) with three categorical 
proxies of preference for income redistribution as dependent variables, as described in Table 1 
(preference for ‘a more equal income distribution’, for ‘eliminating income inequality’, and 
for ‘guaranteeing basic needs’, respectively). Due to missing observations in the regressors 
and regressands, not all 3x4 possible combinations could be estimated. Table 4 reports the 
coefficient estimates, their level of significance and the number of observations in the 
regression samples.  
Almost all regressions (but one) in Table 4 suggest that people who perceive the 
income generating process as fair favor less redistribution through the government. This is 
observable for the measures ‘poverty due to laziness’, ‘chance to escape poverty’ and 
Dependent variable: Life Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hard work brings success in the long run 0.224***
[0.016]
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice 0.374***
[0.028]
People have chance to escape poverty 0.460***
[0.058]
Conservative ideology 0.305***
[0.021]
Observations 180,985 136,683 63,880 291,305
R‐squared 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.25
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‘conservative ideology’. Notably, these individual ideology and perceived fairness effects are, 
given that we employ country fixed effects, independent of 'national' beliefs and political 
cultures and thus relative to countries’ potentially time-invariant average perceptions. The 
marginal effects suggest that having high fairness perceptions decreases the demand for 
government activities by up to half a category (out of possible 10 in column 1) or a third of a 
category (out of possible 5 in column 2). Thus, the results are in line with Proposition 2, 
suggesting that persons who believe in procedural fairness oppose government redistribution. 
 
Table 4: Fairness perceptions and the demand for income redistribution 
 
Notes: OLS estimations. Dependent variable is a 5- or 10-point scale measure of preference for income redistribution. Cluster adjusted 
standard errors in parentheses. All models include the baseline micro-variables, income, education and occupational status, and interacted 
country- and wave- fixed effects (not reported). Missing regressions are due to insufficient sample sizes. *, **, *** denote significances at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. The countries included in each regression sample are presented in Table D3 of the Appendix. 
 
Somewhat astonishing is the increase in the probability of favoring a more equal 
income distribution expressed by persons e.g. who also believe that ‘hard work brings success 
in the long run’, possibly reflecting a modern version of Weber’s hypothesis of a Protestant 
work ethic, combined with a charitable attitude towards the poor. 21  Arguably, ‘having 
success’ is multidimensional, whereas ‘escaping poverty’ is one-dimensionally related to 
gaining income only. However, as this variable can only be included in model 1, we cannot 
                                                 
21 In the traditional Calvinist view and according to their predestination theory, only the efforts of the ‘blessed’ 
would yield economic success, in contrast to that by the ‘lost souls’. Thus, economic success in ‘this world’ is 
perceived by Calvinists as a signal for being chosen to have a good afterlife.  
 
            
Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err.
Hard work brings success in the long run 0.08**  [0.04] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Adj. R‐Squared 0.09              ‐ ‐
Number of observations 188,420              ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice  ‐0.57*** [0.05] ‐0.29***       [0.03] ‐0.03***       [0.01]
Adj. R‐Squared 0.1              0.12              0.96             
Number of observations 130,031              31,811              143,516             
People have chance to escape poverty ‐0.40***       [0.06] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Adj. R‐Squared 0.08              ‐ ‐
Number of observations 63,111              ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology ‐0.66*** [0.04] ‐0.35***  [0.06] ‐0.01***       [0.01]
Adj. R‐Squared 0.11              0.12              0.90             
Number of observations 278,134              37,581              306,828             
(1) (2) (3)
Incomes should be more 
equal   
It is important to eliminate 
income inequality
It is important to 
guarantee basic needs
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draw a clear conclusion on whether the positive sign is a statistical artifact or indicates a 
generic relation.  
Overall, the results in Table 4 support the prediction of Proposition 2 that perceived 
social mobility reduces the demand for income redistribution from the rich to the poor. This 
result is required as a basis upon which the interpretation of the following results rests. 
Table 5 tests the second part of Proposition 2, which predicts a negative relationship 
between a preference for redistribution and individual welfare. This prediction translates into 
our empirical model based on the WVS that persons with a preference for ‘a more equal 
income distribution’, for ‘eliminating income inequality’, or for ‘guaranteeing basic needs’ 
(see Table 4) should report lower levels of subjective well-being. All three columns of Table 
5 indeed show that persons who demand a more equal income distribution (potentially 
through government intervention) and guaranteed basic needs for everybody are less satisfied 
with their lives compared to those with no such preferences. With coefficient estimates 
between -0.14 and -0.24, the quantitative effect on subjective well-being is of medium size, 
comparable to that of, for example, 'cohabiting' as opposed to being 'divorced or separated'. 
Overall, Tables 4 and 5 present evidence in line with Proposition 2: we find that those 
who perceive their society as fair are less likely to demand a more equal (post-tax and  
-transfer) income distribution. Furthermore, we also find that those who do demand more 
equal incomes report lower levels of life satisfaction. 
 
Table 5: Subjective well-being and the demand for redistribution 
 
Dependent variable: Life Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3)
Incomes should be more equal    ‐0.218***
[0.021]
It is important to eliminate income inequality ‐0.239***
[0.041]
It is important to guarantee basic needs ‐0.142*
(0.079)
Observations 255,449 38,257 38,782
R‐squared 0.24 0.28 0.28
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Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. Cluster adjusted standard errors in parentheses. 
All models include the baseline micro-variables, income, education and occupational status, and interacted country- and wave- fixed effects 
(not reported). *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. The countries included in each regression sample 
are presented in Table D3 of the Appendix. 
 
 
4.4. Propositions 3 and 4: Inequality and fairness perceptions in low and high actual mobility 
countries 
While Proposition 3 predicts a positive interaction between fairness perceptions and income 
inequality on subjective well-being, Proposition 4 makes the seemingly counter-intuitive 
prediction that this pattern is stronger in countries with low actual social mobility. We test 
these propositions by interacting the individual fairness perception variables with the Gini 
coefficient, and subsequently splitting the regression samples by actual social mobility at the 
country level. As described above, we employ two sets of social mobility measures: one for 
intergenerational income/wage persistence; and one for educational mobility across 
generations.  
Our theoretical model predicts that in the sample with low actual social mobility, we 
should observe a positive interaction between perceived fairness and income inequality. For 
countries with high upward mobility, our model theoretically predicts the positive interaction 
to become smaller and weaker. We test these predictions in Tables 6 and 7. 
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Table 6: Fairness perception and Income Inequality – low and high intergenerational 
mobility in income and wages 
 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. Cluster adjusted standard errors in parentheses. 
All models include the baseline micro-variables, income, education and occupational status, and interacted country- and wave- fixed effects 
(not reported). *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. The countries included in each regression sample 
are presented in Table D3 of the Appendix. 
 
 
Table 6 tests Proposition 4 by employing measures of mobility in wages and income while 
Table 7 employs measures of mobility in education instead. The model in Tables 6 and 7 and 
the empirical corroboration of Proposition 4 hinges on the assumption that social mobility, 
educational mobility, and wage mobility are sufficiently correlated. For all fairness perception 
measures in Table 6, in low wage or income mobility countries the effect of income inequality 
(1) Low                (1) Low                (1) Low               
Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err.
Intergenerational earnings elasticity (d'Addio 2007)
Conservative ideology ‐0.13 [0.32] ‐0.24 [0.29] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 0.73 [0.72] 0.91 [0.67] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.46 [0.37] 0.96* [0.50] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.57* [0.79] ‐1.70 [1.15] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.12 [0.34] 0.1 [0.36]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.65 [0.77] 0.34 [0.79]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.09 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08
Number of observations 35,928 23,159 25,084 16,917 22,121 10,949
Summary measure of wage persistence, male (Causa et al. 2009)
Conservative ideology ‐0.18 [0.15] ‐0.10 [0.45] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 0.78* [0.37] 0.52 [0.98] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.02 [0.26] 0.73 [0.50] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.53 [0.60] ‐1.06 [1.01] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.06 [0.22] ‐0.26 [0.34]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.37 [0.55] 1.02 [0.72]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.07 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.11
Number of observations 26,991 21,365 17,239 10,800 18,401 13,900
Summary measure of wage persistence, female (Causa et al. 2009)
Conservative ideology ‐0.25 [0.15] ‐0.22 [0.41] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 1.01** [0.41] 0.75 [0.91] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.11 [0.33] 0.53 [0.40] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.89 [0.81] ‐0.63 [0.83] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.00 [0.24] 0.03 [0.32]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.51 [0.61] 0.40 [0.66]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10
Number of observations 24,768 23,588 13,797 14,242 18,336 13,965
Intergenerational income elasticity (Blanden 2013)
Conservative ideology ‐0.96*** [0.24] 0.02 [0.23] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 2.55*** [0.48] 0.30 [0.53] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.31 [0.26] 0.16 [0.59] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.23** [0.56] 0.11 [1.31] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.59 [0.50] 0.33 [0.31]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.81 [1.10] ‐0.32 [0.68]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.08 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.13
Number of observations 28,882 25,785 22,768 17,397 17,001 13,143
(1)  High    (1)  High    (1)  High   
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on subjective well-being is the more positive the higher the individuals’ fairness perceptions 
are. In these countries our theory predicts that the pool of high fairness perception individuals 
comprises a larger share of high-income people who profit from higher inequality via higher 
status utility. Equally in line with Proposition 4, in high actual mobility country samples we 
observe only insignificant or weakly significant interactions with inequality. In general, the 
regressions that employ measures of educational mobility are also in line with our predictions, 
particularly those that employ large regression samples based on ‘conservative ideology’ and 
‘hard work brings success’ as measures of fairness perceptions. The interaction in high actual 
mobility countries is again in most cases smaller than in countries with low mobility. A 
positive sign of the interaction term can be interpreted as an indication that individuals who 
have experienced upward social mobility in their family – and believe this to be the result of 
fair institutions – would experience an adverse impact of income redistribution on their well-
being. Again, we find support for Proposition 4 for fairness perception measures that are 
similar to those employed in previous empirical studies (e.g., Corneo and Gruener, 2002, 
Alesina and LaFerrara, 2005).  
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Table 7: Fairness perception and Income Inequality – low and high intergenerational 
mobility in educational achievements 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. Cluster adjusted standard errors in parentheses. 
All models include the baseline micro-variables, income, education and occupational status, and interacted country- and wave- fixed effects 
(not reported). *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. The countries included in each regression sample 
are presented in Table D3 of the Appendix. 
 
 
To summarize, the empirical results are in line with our propositions. Individuals who 
perceive their society as unfair are less likely to be satisfied with their lives (Proposition 1), 
and are more likely to oppose redistributive government activities (Proposition 2). In 
countries with low actual mobility, people with high fairness perceptions are better off, the 
Measure of social mobility Level of mobility
(1) Low                 (1)  High    (1) Low                 (1)  High    (1) Low                 (1)  High   
Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err.
Summary measure of persistence in below upper secondary education (Causa et al. 2009)
Conservative ideology ‐0.25 [0.15] ‐0.22 [0.41] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 1.01** [0.41] 0.75 [0.91] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.11 [0.33] 0.53 [0.40] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.89 [0.81] ‐0.63 [0.83] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.00 [0.24] 0.03 [0.32]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.51 [0.61] 0.40 [0.66]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10
Number of observations 24,768 23,588 13,797 14,242 18,336 13,965
Summary measure of persistence in tertiary education (Causa et al. 2009)
Conservative ideology ‐0.20 [0.19] ‐0.31 [0.37] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 0.86* [0.46] 0.96 [0.82] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.01 [0.28] 0.59 [0.41] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.58 [0.67] ‐0.75 [0.85] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.14 [0.22] 0.19 [0.33]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.84 [0.52] 0.05 [0.70]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.09 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10
Number of observations 27,610 20,746 15,588 12,451 18,763 13,538
Intergenerational correlation in educational attainment (Hertz et al. 2007)
Conservative ideology ‐0.15 [0.24] 0.60** [0.23] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 0.81 [0.49] ‐0.73 [0.54] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.59*** [0.13] 0.48*** [0.11] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.78** [0.30] ‐0.58* [0.29] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.01 [0.22] 0.66*** [0.21]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.75* [0.42] ‐0.74 [0.46]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.19 0.27 0.15 0.28 0.17 0.28
Number of observations 64,521 57,374 39,071 38,370 24,255 35,272
Mobility in educational level  (Chevalier 2004)
Conservative ideology 0.18 [0.32] 0.52* [0.26] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 0.09 [0.71] ‐0.75 [0.58] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.12 [0.24] 0.56*** [0.10] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.31 [0.55] ‐0.72*** [0.24] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.63* [0.32] 0.70** [0.31]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.90 [0.68] ‐0.90 [0.70]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.16 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.12
Number of observations 42,041 37,921 30,929 24,333 21,818 24,913
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less redistribution takes place: the higher income inequality is, the more positive are the 
effects of high fairness perceptions (Proposition 3). In contrast, in high actual mobility 
countries, we observe that the pool of people with high fairness perceptions is less likely to 
experience a more positive effect of income inequality (Proposition 4). Because these 
findings provide an important qualification to some standard results of elementary welfare 
economics, we proceed with a short discussion in the concluding section. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
The empirical literature on the relationship between income inequality and happiness has 
yielded ambiguous results. The point of departure of our analysis is the conjecture that one of 
the potential reasons for this confusion might be that people evaluate the fairness of the 
income distribution (i.e., the distribution generation process) differently, and that these 
subjective evaluations eventually affect their subjective well-being. Extending the previous 
literature, we also make the case that inequality assessments hinge on whether or not social 
mobility expectations meet actual social mobility. 
We illustrate the relationship between inequality and subjective well-being in a small 
formal model where individual effort and labor market participation depends on subjectively 
perceived probabilities of success that, in turn, reflect fairness perceptions: the higher the 
perceived fairness of a society, the closer the individually perceived connection between 
individual effort and economic outcomes. We therefore in general expect a positive 
relationship between perceived fairness and overall well-being, and a negative effect on the 
preference for government redistribution. If ex ante fairness perceptions are sufficiently low, 
the individual will choose an investment level of zero, and benefit from a reduction of income 
inequality through taxes and transfers. We also distinguish between the effects of perceived 
and actual fairness. Low or high actual fairness is associated with low or high upward 
mobility, respectively. We argue that a status utility implies that in general, individuals with 
high fairness perceptions have a more favorable attitude towards income inequality than 
individuals with low fairness perceptions. Furthermore, we argue somewhat paradoxically, 
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that this effect is smaller in countries that are characterized by higher objective mobility, as 
measured by low levels of observed income inequality. The reason for this is the difference in 
the composition of the pool of high fairness individuals: differences between low fairness 
perceptions and high actual fairness (mobility) lead to positive surprises for individuals who 
have invested relatively little effort. Thus, in actually fair (mobile) societies the pool of 
individuals with high ex post fairness perceptions comprises a larger share of people with 
relatively low incomes, who do not profit from status utility. In low fairness (mobility) 
countries, the pool comprises a larger share of high-income people who profit to a larger 
extent from status utility when income inequality is higher. 
We test this model using combined individual-level data of the pooled second to fifth 
waves of the World Values Survey (1990-2008), containing about 300,000 interviewed 
individuals in 80 countries. According to the results, the respondents’ belief that income 
inequality in their society is the result of a comparably fair market process makes them 
considerably more satisfied with their lives, while a demand for more government 
redistribution for correcting the market-income distribution is negatively associated with 
happiness. However, differentiating by level of actual social mobility in a country, in 
countries with lower upward-mobility we find evidence for a positive effect of inequality for 
individuals with high fairness perceptions, in line with our theoretical prediction. In contrast, 
in countries with plenty of economic opportunities and equal chances to success, this positive 
interaction effect is either smaller or disappears, depending on the mobility measure used.  
The findings challenge the standard Lerner argument that more redistribution and less 
income inequality unambiguously leads to an increase in welfare of the average person, and 
thus, in average welfare. Instead, the model and the empirical analysis suggest that for broad 
groups of countries the potential effects of inequality depend on the interplay between 
perceived and actual fairness of the institutional framework. The overall effect of reductions 
of inequality on subjective well-being is thus much more ambiguous at the aggregate level of 
society than predicted by many standard models. As such, our findings may hold implications 
for both policy making and future theorizing on the subject.  
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By keeping our framework relatively simple, we implicitly leave several questions for 
future research. A possible extension of our framework would be to look at updating fairness 
perceptions in the long run, possibly across generations. If there is long-term convergence of 
beliefs to objective fairness, then the disappointment of erring individuals underlying 
Proposition 4 would disappear in the long run, as low-fairness individuals subsequently 
realize that they actually live in a high-fairness society.  
 It seems beneficial to overall welfare that governments should not only provide 
policies and institutions that guarantee social mobility, but also communicate these policies 
convincingly, so that individuals can choose their effort levels accordingly. Individuals who 
believe in the fairness of the market-income-generation-process experience a higher 
subjective well-being. Thus, policies should aim at fostering competition, reducing privileges 
of interest groups and closing the gap between individual effort and success. Inequality is 
easier to accept if it is the result of unequally distributed skills and chosen effort levels than if 
it is due to institutional design and low social mobility.  
Our results suggest that creating a society with such equal opportunities would be 
superior with regard to fostering higher subjective well-being to a paternalistic and overly 
redistributive welfare state.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: Complete estimations for table 2 and 3, ordered probit model for table 4. 
A.1. Complete baseline model; fairness perceptions and life satisfaction  
(Table 2 in the main  text) 
Dependent variable:  Life Satisfaction     
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
age  ‐0.1000***  ‐0.107***  ‐0.132***  ‐0.112*** 
  (0.0183)  (0.0230)  (0.0316)  (0.0143) 
age_s  0.164***  0.179***  0.223***  0.190*** 
  (0.0373)  (0.0470)  (0.0642)  (0.0294) 
age_3  ‐0.0820***  ‐0.0919***  ‐0.110***  ‐0.0987*** 
  (0.0227)  (0.0285)  (0.0401)  (0.0181) 
male  ‐0.00898  ‐7.31e‐05  ‐0.0174  ‐0.0470* 
  (0.0205)  (0.0260)  (0.0347)  (0.0245) 
buddhist  0.256***  0.270  0.504**  0.177*** 
  (0.0876)  (0.164)  (0.228)  (0.0672) 
muslim  ‐0.0635  ‐0.0680  ‐0.00893  ‐0.0213 
  (0.0953)  (0.190)  (0.241)  (0.0809) 
catholic  0.136***  0.0947  0.203  0.0968** 
  (0.0481)  (0.0936)  (0.155)  (0.0436) 
protestant  0.213***  0.210**  0.309*  0.200*** 
  (0.0458)  (0.0886)  (0.164)  (0.0420) 
orthodox  ‐0.135**  ‐0.200*  ‐0.129  ‐0.131** 
  (0.0657)  (0.113)  (0.196)  (0.0572) 
other_christ  0.240***  0.255*  0.528***  0.0582 
  (0.0909)  (0.136)  (0.185)  (0.146) 
no_rel  0.0857*  0.0987  0.189  0.0580 
  (0.0507)  (0.0985)  (0.165)  (0.0467) 
jewish  ‐0.0861  ‐0.0617  0.140  ‐0.0526 
  (0.163)  (0.226)  (0.268)  (0.121) 
hindu  0.200  0.258  0.438  0.197* 
  (0.158)  (0.274)  (0.378)  (0.119) 
age_Kat2  ‐0.00827  ‐0.0250  ‐0.0350  0.0170 
  (0.0411)  (0.0484)  (0.0799)  (0.0303) 
age_Kat3  ‐0.0320  ‐0.0863  ‐0.0818  0.00825 
  (0.0582)  (0.0682)  (0.115)  (0.0436) 
age_Kat4  ‐0.0868  ‐0.145*  ‐0.101  ‐0.0664 
  (0.0686)  (0.0836)  (0.135)  (0.0538) 
2 
 
age_Kat5  ‐0.0589  ‐0.107  ‐0.180  ‐0.0602 
  (0.0922)  (0.108)  (0.154)  (0.0700) 
age_Kat6  ‐0.131  ‐0.135  ‐0.298*  ‐0.116 
  (0.103)  (0.123)  (0.173)  (0.0805) 
single_f  0.192***  0.269***  0.206***  0.185*** 
  (0.0425)  (0.0456)  (0.0680)  (0.0364) 
single_m  0.189***  0.229***  0.241***  0.157*** 
  (0.0451)  (0.0502)  (0.0783)  (0.0412) 
married  0.675***  0.735***  0.743***  0.659*** 
  (0.0276)  (0.0264)  (0.0452)  (0.0261) 
cohab  0.402***  0.399***  0.383***  0.357*** 
  (0.0512)  (0.0599)  (0.0844)  (0.0455) 
prev_child1  ‐0.0831***  ‐0.0545*  ‐0.0972**  ‐0.116*** 
  (0.0274)  (0.0307)  (0.0470)  (0.0265) 
prev_child2  ‐0.0918***  ‐0.0166  ‐0.102*  ‐0.0960*** 
  (0.0299)  (0.0314)  (0.0523)  (0.0277) 
prev_child3  ‐0.136***  ‐0.0778**  ‐0.100  ‐0.151*** 
  (0.0359)  (0.0380)  (0.0667)  (0.0334) 
rel_att1  0.463***  0.489***  0.457***  0.377*** 
  (0.0421)  (0.0537)  (0.0632)  (0.0488) 
rel_att2  0.282***  0.282***  0.235***  0.217*** 
  (0.0391)  (0.0412)  (0.0603)  (0.0414) 
rel_att3  0.164***  0.193***  0.126**  0.120*** 
  (0.0369)  (0.0365)  (0.0581)  (0.0330) 
rel_att4  0.141***  0.152***  0.118**  0.119*** 
  (0.0306)  (0.0348)  (0.0542)  (0.0264) 
rel_att5  0.0866*  0.160***    0.105*** 
  (0.0471)  (0.0419)    (0.0389) 
rel_att6  0.0792***  0.0756**  0.112**  0.0497* 
  (0.0287)  (0.0314)  (0.0479)  (0.0280) 
rel_att7  0.0224  0.0144  ‐0.0607  ‐0.000348 
  (0.0312)  (0.0306)  (0.0460)  (0.0270) 
belief_sup  0.107***  0.118***  0.127***  0.0858*** 
  (0.0317)  (0.0269)  (0.0423)  (0.0277) 
conservative2        0.351*** 
        (0.0224) 
hardwork1  0.248***       
  (0.0172)       
laziness3    0.418***     
    (0.0315)     
chance      0.510***   
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      (0.0564)   
Constant  9.012***  8.971***  8.267***  9.328*** 
  (0.262)  (0.324)  (0.444)  (0.209) 
         
Observations  180,985  136,683  63,880  291,305 
R‐squared  0.210  0.239  0.261  0.219 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. Cluster adjusted standard errors in 
parentheses. All models include the baseline micro-variables, and interactive country-wave effects (not reported). Income, education 
and occupational status are excluded from the model. *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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A.2.  Complete extended model - fairness perceptions, income, education, occupational 
status included (Table 3 in the main paper) 
Dependent variable:  Life Satisfaction     
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
age  ‐0.114***  ‐0.125***  ‐0.150***  ‐0.129*** 
  (0.0188)  (0.0230)  (0.0319)  (0.0144) 
age_s  0.195***  0.220***  0.261***  0.226*** 
  (0.0384)  (0.0469)  (0.0657)  (0.0297) 
age_3  ‐0.0980***  ‐0.115***  ‐0.130***  ‐0.118*** 
  (0.0233)  (0.0283)  (0.0410)  (0.0183) 
male  ‐0.0287  ‐0.0161  ‐0.0326  ‐0.0512** 
  (0.0199)  (0.0255)  (0.0381)  (0.0206) 
buddhist  0.240***  0.199  0.384*  0.162** 
  (0.0824)  (0.149)  (0.207)  (0.0627) 
muslim  0.0329  0.0289  0.0737  0.0576 
  (0.0803)  (0.156)  (0.192)  (0.0720) 
catholic  0.102**  0.0336  0.109  0.0564 
  (0.0427)  (0.0821)  (0.126)  (0.0394) 
protestant  0.170***  0.145*  0.212*  0.148*** 
  (0.0374)  (0.0734)  (0.121)  (0.0353) 
orthodox  ‐0.135**  ‐0.224**  ‐0.187  ‐0.139*** 
  (0.0589)  (0.0983)  (0.159)  (0.0513) 
other_christ  0.269***  0.200*  0.419***  0.111 
  (0.0633)  (0.119)  (0.148)  (0.113) 
no_rel  0.0544  0.0353  0.0883  0.0180 
  (0.0452)  (0.0845)  (0.131)  (0.0426) 
jewish  ‐0.227  ‐0.203  ‐0.0493  ‐0.186 
  (0.175)  (0.232)  (0.278)  (0.123) 
hindu  0.211*  0.218  0.379  0.192** 
  (0.126)  (0.210)  (0.276)  (0.0922) 
age_Kat2  0.00807  ‐0.00945  ‐0.0207  0.0310 
  (0.0385)  (0.0460)  (0.0701)  (0.0289) 
age_Kat3  ‐0.0443  ‐0.105  ‐0.0984  ‐0.00505 
  (0.0554)  (0.0647)  (0.102)  (0.0421) 
age_Kat4  ‐0.114*  ‐0.183**  ‐0.126  ‐0.0910* 
  (0.0664)  (0.0817)  (0.126)  (0.0526) 
age_Kat5  ‐0.0308  ‐0.0755  ‐0.130  ‐0.0280 
  (0.0877)  (0.103)  (0.143)  (0.0670) 
age_Kat6  ‐0.0191  ‐0.0280  ‐0.164  ‐0.00473 
  (0.0978)  (0.117)  (0.166)  (0.0775) 
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inc_cat2  0.237***  0.257***  0.270**  0.239*** 
  (0.0626)  (0.0734)  (0.131)  (0.0448) 
inc_cat3  0.413***  0.430***  0.403**  0.417*** 
  (0.0792)  (0.0895)  (0.169)  (0.0568) 
inc_cat4  0.603***  0.605***  0.587***  0.627*** 
  (0.0857)  (0.0894)  (0.171)  (0.0602) 
inc_cat5  0.802***  0.721***  0.754***  0.815*** 
  (0.0989)  (0.0984)  (0.177)  (0.0710) 
inc_cat6  0.936***  0.801***  0.803***  0.951*** 
  (0.0996)  (0.0981)  (0.175)  (0.0728) 
inc_cat7  1.105***  0.919***  0.970***  1.105*** 
  (0.105)  (0.100)  (0.182)  (0.0766) 
inc_cat8  1.215***  0.985***  1.071***  1.195*** 
  (0.111)  (0.101)  (0.181)  (0.0823) 
inc_cat9  1.208***  1.081***  1.180***  1.227*** 
  (0.107)  (0.102)  (0.187)  (0.0823) 
inc_cat10  1.314***  1.199***  1.318***  1.297*** 
  (0.109)  (0.102)  (0.184)  (0.0832) 
inc_cat11  0.713***  0.661***  0.678***  0.749*** 
  (0.0808)  (0.0832)  (0.146)  (0.0605) 
edu_cat2  0.230***  0.234***  0.317**  0.129*** 
  (0.0594)  (0.0849)  (0.124)  (0.0480) 
edu_cat3  0.275***  0.259**  0.334*  0.205*** 
  (0.0740)  (0.106)  (0.167)  (0.0570) 
edu_cat4  0.401***  0.405***  0.519***  0.284*** 
  (0.0705)  (0.102)  (0.150)  (0.0591) 
edu_cat5  0.288***  0.334***  0.364**  0.208*** 
  (0.0828)  (0.110)  (0.168)  (0.0617) 
edu_cat6  0.415***  0.450***  0.554***  0.299*** 
  (0.0770)  (0.109)  (0.164)  (0.0631) 
edu_cat7  0.428***  0.478***  0.496***  0.342*** 
  (0.0784)  (0.112)  (0.158)  (0.0653) 
edu_cat8  0.561***  0.626***  0.706***  0.440*** 
  (0.0816)  (0.121)  (0.175)  (0.0700) 
edu_cat9  0.288**  0.334*  0.501*  0.247** 
  (0.129)  (0.172)  (0.264)  (0.106) 
single_f  0.102***  0.178***  0.0996*  0.0876** 
  (0.0378)  (0.0403)  (0.0581)  (0.0367) 
single_m  0.120***  0.170***  0.169**  0.0726 
  (0.0410)  (0.0452)  (0.0670)  (0.0450) 
married  0.488***  0.556***  0.559***  0.461*** 
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  (0.0329)  (0.0295)  (0.0512)  (0.0283) 
cohab  0.314***  0.345***  0.345***  0.269*** 
  (0.0464)  (0.0562)  (0.0797)  (0.0415) 
prev_child1  ‐0.0414*  ‐0.0257  ‐0.0650  ‐0.0806*** 
  (0.0239)  (0.0280)  (0.0426)  (0.0293) 
prev_child2  ‐0.0538*  0.00615  ‐0.0696  ‐0.0680** 
  (0.0277)  (0.0303)  (0.0544)  (0.0308) 
prev_child3  ‐0.0179  0.0143  0.0229  ‐0.0471 
  (0.0307)  (0.0343)  (0.0588)  (0.0365) 
self_empl  0.0397  0.0424  0.0487  0.0172 
  (0.0294)  (0.0354)  (0.0644)  (0.0263) 
housewife  0.0622  0.0391  0.0783  0.0787** 
  (0.0378)  (0.0408)  (0.0664)  (0.0345) 
retired  ‐0.0819**  ‐0.117***  ‐0.0949  ‐0.107*** 
  (0.0373)  (0.0415)  (0.0647)  (0.0310) 
other  ‐0.110*  ‐0.153**  ‐0.00155  ‐0.116*** 
  (0.0585)  (0.0594)  (0.0846)  (0.0439) 
student  0.0700*  0.0625  0.0858  0.0277 
  (0.0371)  (0.0422)  (0.0631)  (0.0283) 
unempl_indi  ‐0.465***  ‐0.613***  ‐0.495***  ‐0.521*** 
  (0.0481)  (0.0584)  (0.0800)  (0.0392) 
rel_att1  0.446***  0.476***  0.456***  0.378*** 
  (0.0415)  (0.0519)  (0.0603)  (0.0437) 
rel_att2  0.262***  0.262***  0.226***  0.211*** 
  (0.0376)  (0.0370)  (0.0532)  (0.0371) 
rel_att3  0.143***  0.168***  0.122**  0.111*** 
  (0.0365)  (0.0349)  (0.0554)  (0.0310) 
rel_att4  0.119***  0.126***  0.111**  0.104*** 
  (0.0306)  (0.0344)  (0.0542)  (0.0258) 
rel_att5  0.0794  0.142***    0.0980** 
  (0.0492)  (0.0401)    (0.0390) 
rel_att6  0.0605**  0.0477*  0.0974**  0.0339 
  (0.0272)  (0.0287)  (0.0440)  (0.0266) 
rel_att7  0.0184  0.00510  ‐0.0497  ‐0.00139 
  (0.0300)  (0.0284)  (0.0430)  (0.0249) 
belief_sup  0.157***  0.159***  0.181***  0.118*** 
  (0.0306)  (0.0260)  (0.0383)  (0.0335) 
conservative2        0.305*** 
        (0.0209) 
hardwork1  0.224***       
  (0.0162)       
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Fcowave132    1.057***     
    (0.133)     
laziness3    0.374***     
    (0.0283)     
chance      0.460***   
      (0.0582)   
Constant  8.280***  7.296***  6.839***  8.688*** 
  (0.296)  (0.334)  (0.559)  (0.237) 
         
Observations  180,985  136,683  63,880  291,305 
R‐squared  0.239  0.262  0.288  0.247 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. Cluster adjusted standard errors in 
parentheses. All models include the baseline micro-variables, income, education and occupational status, and interactive country-wave 
effects (not reported). *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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A.3. Table A3: Fairness perceptions and the demand for income redistribution 
 (Table 4 in the main paper with ordered probit estimation)  
 
            
                    Coef.       Std. err.
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐0.04*** [0.01]
Number of observations 188,420
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐0.20*** [0.02] ‐0.29*** [0.03] ‐0.22*** [0.03]
Number of observations 130,031 31,811 143,516
People have chance to escape poverty ‐0.14*** [0.02]
Number of observations 63111
Conservative ideology ‐0.23*** [0.02] ‐0.33*** [0.05] ‐0.14*** [0.03]
Number of observations 278,134 37,581 306,828             
Incomes should be more 
equal   
Important to eliminate 
income inequality
Importance of 
guaranteeing basic 
needs
(1) (2) (3)
 
Ordered probit estimations. Dependent variable is a 5- or 10-point scale measure of preference for income redistribution. Cluster 
adjusted standard errors in parentheses. All models include the baseline micro-variables, income, education and occupational status, 
and interactive country-wave effects (not reported). Missing regressions are due to insufficient sample sizes. *, **, *** denote 
significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Guideline Appendix B and C: 
In the following alternative specifications of table 6 and 7 in the main paper are presented as 
robustness checks. The first specification is a fully interacted model, the second includes our first 
optimism questions additionally, the third includes our second optimism measure and the fourth tests 
our assumptions for employed people only. 
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B. Robustness check related to table 6: Fairness perception and Income Inequality- low and 
high mobility in income and wages 
B.1. Fully interacted model  
Measure of social mobility
(1) Low                  (1) Low                 
Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err.
Intergenerational earnings elasticity (d'Addio 2007)
Hard work x Income Inequality 22.15*** [4.08] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality x  Mobility ‐31.96*** [5.80] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ 10.85** [5.32] ‐ ‐
Laziness x Income Inequality x Mobility ‐ ‐ ‐13.05* [7.51] ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐6.66 [4.50]
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality x Mobility ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 11.34* [6.29]
Adj. R‐Squared 0.02 0.01 0.01
Number of observations 42,399 33,340 60,770
Summary measure of wage persistence, male (Causa et al. 2009)
Hard work x Income Inequality 2.30 [1.93] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality x  Mobility ‐3.37 [3.22] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐1.30 [1.68] ‐ ‐
Laziness x Income Inequality x Mobility ‐ ‐ 2.79 [2.86] ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.01 [1.80]
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality x Mobility ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐1.02 [3.04]
Adj. R‐Squared 0.01 0.01 0.01
Number of observations 28,322 32,638 50,005
Summary measure of wage persistence, female (Causa et al.2009)
Hard work x Income Inequality 1.93 [1.29] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality x  Mobility ‐2.18 [2.00] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ 1.60 [1.27] ‐ ‐
Laziness x Income Inequality x Mobility ‐ ‐ ‐1.80 [2.13] ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.40 [1.30]
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality x Mobility ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.81 [2.11]
Adj. R‐Squared 0.03 0.02 0.02
Number of observations 28,322 32,638 50,005
Intergenerational income elasticity (Blanden 2013)
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐3.3 [2.53] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality x  Mobility 3.28 [3.76] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ 2.68 [2.82] ‐ ‐
Laziness x Income Inequality x Mobility ‐ ‐ ‐2.81 [4.32] ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐3.68 [2.56]
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality x Mobility ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 7.84** [3.80]
Adj. R‐Squared 0.01 0.01 0.01
Number of observations 40,514 30,377 56,280
Level of mobility
(1)  High   
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. Cluster adjusted standard errors in 
parentheses.  All models include the baseline micro-variables, income, education and occupational status, and interactive country-wave 
effects (not reported). *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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B.2. Identical to table 6 in the main paper, only focusing on the 1990 wave including a 
measure of optimism ( "I am good at getting what I want") 
Measure of social mobility Level of mobility
(1) Low                  (1) Low                  (1) Low                 
Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err.
Intergenerational earnings elasticity (d'Addio 2007)
Conservative ideology ‐0.63 [0.50] ‐0.52** [0.18] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 1.84 [1.12] 1.45** [0.41] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.12 [0.27] 1.89*** [0.28] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.82 [0.66] ‐4.00*** [0.69] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.1 [0.28] ‐0.19 [0.39]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.1 [0.66] 1.01 [0.87]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.08 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07
Number of observations 13768 5439 13227 5273 11916 4378
Summary measure of wage persistence, male (Causa et al. 2009)
Conservative ideology ‐0.12 [0.18] ‐0.08 [0.69] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 0.56 [0.46] 0.33 [1.50] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.05 [0.13] 1.11* [0.55] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.81* [0.34] ‐1.91 [1.12] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.22 [0.16] ‐0.13 [0.51]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.10** [0.41] 0.66 [1.00]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.07 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.11
Number of observations 12,484 5,902 11,990 5,766      10,735 4,816
Summary measure of wage persistence, female (Causa et al.2009)
Conservative ideology ‐0.18 [0.26] ‐0.31 [0.56] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 0.79 [0.71] 0.78 [1.30] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.18 [0.28] 0.77* [0.38] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.19 [0.76] ‐1.22 [0.83] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.1 [0.27] ‐0.05 [0.42]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.77 [0.73] 0.56 [0.84]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.07 0.1 0.08 0.1 0.07 0.1
Number of observations 11,003 7,383 10,541 7,215      9,565 5,986
Intergenerational income elasticity (Blanden 2013)
Conservative ideology ‐0.90* [0.36] ‐0.65* [0.25] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 2.34** [0.66] 1.81** [0.60] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.61** [0.21] 1.70** [0.40] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.91*** [0.45] ‐3.45** [0.93] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.26 [0.20] 0.09 [0.41]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.92* [0.37] 0.2 [0.96]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.07 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13
Number of observations 9,249 7,619 9,006 7,345      8,125 6,155
(1)  High   (1)  High    (1)  High   
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. Cluster adjusted standard errors in 
parentheses.  All models include the baseline micro-variables, income, education and occupational status, and interactive country-wave 
effects (not reported). *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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B.3. Identical to table 6 in the main paper, only focusing on the 1990 wave including 
another measure of optimism ( " I usually count on being successful in everything I 
do") 
Measure of social mobility Level of mobility
(1) Low                  (1) Low                  (1) Low                 
Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err.
Intergenerational earnings elasticity (d'Addio 2007)
Conservative ideology ‐0.55 [0.54] ‐0.33 [0.22] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 1.68 [1.20] 1.05 [0.51] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.11 [0.25] 1.90*** [0.38] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.80 [0.63] ‐3.99** [0.92] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.010 [0.27] ‐0.10 [0.58]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.29 [0.63] 0.79 [1.29]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06
Number of observations 13,768 5,422 13,227 5,255      11,916 4,363
Summary measure of wage persistence, male (Causa et al. 2009)
Conservative ideology ‐0.18 [0.19] 0.12 [0.68] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 0.71 [0.47] ‐0.06 [1.43] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.06 [0.12] 1.16 [0.60] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.84** [0.31] ‐1.97 [1.23] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.22 [0.18] ‐0.15 [0.65]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.11* [0.47] 0.74 [1.30]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.06 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.11
Number of observations 12,484 5,885 11,990 5,748      10,735 4,801
Summary measure of wage persistence, female (Causa et al.2009)
Conservative ideology ‐0.25 [0.28] ‐0.22 [0.58] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 1 [0.76] 0.6 [1.29] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.18 [0.26] 0.77 [0.42] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.19 [0.72] ‐1.19 [0.91] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.11 [0.29] ‐0.02 [0.52]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.8 [0.78] 0.53 [1.04]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.07 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.10
Number of observations 11,003 7,366 10,541 7,197      9,565 5,971
Intergenerational income elasticity (Blanden 2013)
Conservative ideology ‐1.02** [0.37] ‐0.36* [0.16] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 2.60** [0.70] 1.18** [0.38] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.65** [0.20] 1.74** [0.51] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 2.01*** [0.44] ‐3.50** [1.16] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.29 [0.19] 0.15 [0.59]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.99** [0.36] 0.06 [1.33]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.13
Number of observations 9,249 7,602 9,006 7,327      8,125 6,140
(1)  High    (1)  High     (1)  High   
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. Cluster adjusted standard errors in 
parentheses.  All models include the baseline micro-variables, income, education and occupational status, and interactive country-wave 
effects (not reported). *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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B.4. Identical to table 6 in the main paper, only focusing on employed people. 
Measure of social mobility Level of mobility
(1) Low                  (1) Low                  (1) Low                 
Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err.
Intergenerational earnings elasticity (d'Addio 2007)
Conservative ideology ‐0.13 [0.34] ‐0.27 [0.27] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 0.74 [0.77] 0.99 [0.64] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.44 [0.32] 1.12** [0.49] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.52** [0.69] ‐2.06* [1.13] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.050 [0.41] 0.25 [0.36]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.21 [0.95] ‐0.01 [0.80]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07
Number of observations 33,649 21,893 23,552 16,041    20,758 10,366
Summary measure of wage persistence, male (Causa et al. 2009)
Conservative ideology ‐0.24 [0.15] ‐0.09 [0.47] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 0.88** [0.35] 0.52 [1.04] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.05 [0.24] 0.64 [0.50] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.69 [0.59] ‐0.88 [1.02] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.01 [0.23] ‐0.29 [0.39]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.49 [0.57] 1.05 [0.81]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.07 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.10
Number of observations 25,378 20,204 16,250 10,121    17,300 13,154
Summary measure of wage persistence, female (Causa et al.2009)
Conservative ideology ‐0.29* [0.15] ‐0.27 [0.45] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 1.07** [0.39] 0.87 [0.98] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.15 [0.28] 0.46 [0.41] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.96 [0.70] ‐0.49 [0.86] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.07 [0.25] 0.08 [0.36]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.59 [0.62] 0.28 [0.75]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.07 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.08
Number of observations 23,281 22,301 12,964 13,407    17,233 13,221
Intergenerational income elasticity (Blanden 2013)
Conservative ideology ‐1.03*** [0.24] 0.05 [0.28] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 2.72*** [0.49] 0.26 [0.63] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.18 [0.31] 0.45 [0.52] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.96 [0.68] ‐0.52 [1.16] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.49 [0.43] 0.84* [0.41]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.57 [0.93] ‐1.5 [0.91]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.07 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.09
Number of observations 27,260 23,956 21,493 16,152    16,137 12,199
(1)  High    (1)  High    (1)  High   
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. Cluster adjusted standard errors in 
parentheses.  All models include the baseline micro-variables, income, education and occupational status, and interactive country-wave 
effects (not reported). *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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C. Robustness check related to table 7: Fairness perception and Income Inequality- low and 
high mobility in educational achievements. 
C.1.  Fully interacted model  
Table 7: Fairness perception and Income Inequality - low and high mobility in educational achievements
Measure of social mobility
(1) Low                   (1)  High    (1) Low                 
Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err.
Summary measure of persistence in below upper secondary education (Causa et al. 2009)
Hard work x Income Inequality 4.02 [3.22] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality x  Mobility ‐5.24 [4.03] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ 0.42 [2.55] ‐ ‐
Laziness x Income Inequality x Mobility ‐ ‐ 0.03 [3.25] ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.58 [2.04]
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality x Mobility ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐1.14 [2.91]
Adj. R‐Squared 0.10 0.10 0.10
Number of observations 28,039 32,301 48,356
Summary measure of persistence in tertiary education (Causa et al. 2009)
Hard work x Income Inequality 2.46 [3.43] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality x  Mobility ‐3.38 [5.90] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ 1.81 [1.92] ‐ ‐
Laziness x Income Inequality x Mobility ‐ ‐ ‐2.23 [3.15] ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 4.22* [2.12]
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality x Mobility ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐5.55 [3.42]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.10 0.10 0.10
Number of observations 28,039 32,301 48,356
Intergenerational correlation in educational attainment (Hertz et al. (2007)
Hard work x Income Inequality 0.15 [1.52] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality x  Mobility ‐1.36 [2.54] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ 4.02 [2.58] ‐ ‐
Laziness x Income Inequality x Mobility ‐ ‐ ‐7.31 [4.50] ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 5.54*** [1.61]
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality x Mobility ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐9.41*** [2.76]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.22 0.24 0.22
Number of observations 77,441 59,527 121,895
Mobility in educational level  (Chevalier 2004)
Hard work x Income Inequality 0.61 [0.78] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality x  Mobility ‐0.07 [0.05] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ 0.91 [0.86] ‐ ‐
Laziness x Income Inequality x Mobility ‐ ‐ ‐0.12** [0.06] ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 2.26* [1.13]
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality x Mobility ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.20*** [0.07]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.13 0.14 0.14
Number of observations 55,262 46,731 79,962
Level of mobility
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. Cluster adjusted standard errors in 
parentheses.  All models include the baseline micro-variables, income, education and occupational status, and interactive country-wave 
effects (not reported). *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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C.2.   Identical to table 7 in the main paper, only focusing on the 1990 wave including a 
measure of optimism ( "I am good at getting what I want") 
 
Measure of social mobility Level of mobility
(1) Low                   (1)  High    (1) Low                   (1)  High    (1) Low                   (1)  High   
Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err.
Summary measure of persistence in below upper secondary education (Causa et al. 2009)
Conservative ideology ‐0.18 [0.26] ‐0.31 [0.56] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 0.79 [0.71] 0.78 [1.30] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.18 [0.28] 0.77* [0.38] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.19 [0.76] ‐1.22 [0.83] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.10 [0.27] ‐0.05 [0.42]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.77 [0.73] 0.56 [0.84]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.07 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.10
Number of observations 11,003 7,383 10,541 7,215      9,565 5,986
Summary measure of persistence in tertiary education (Causa et al. 2009)
Conservative ideology ‐0.26 [0.29] ‐0.34 [0.52] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 1.01 [0.83] 0.83 [1.18] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.14 [0.37] 0.79* [0.34] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.07 [1.02] ‐1.21 [0.72] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.13 [0.17] ‐0.18 [0.49]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.16 [0.47] 0.87 [1.02]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10
Number of observations 10,809 7,577 10,345 7,411      9,270 6,281
Intergenerational correlation in educational attainment (Hertz et al. (2007)
Conservative ideology ‐0.25 [0.21] 0.33 [0.29] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 1.11** [0.41] ‐0.44 [0.70] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.13 [0.29] 0.57** [0.21] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.37 [0.68] ‐0.85 [0.64] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.24 [0.27] 0.71** [0.28]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.02 [0.48] ‐1.08 [0.66]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12
Number of observations 10,072 14,495 9,793 14,044    8,969 11,812
Mobility in educational level  (Chevalier 2004)
Conservative ideology ‐0.23 [0.32] 0.42 [0.31] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 1.00 [0.73] ‐0.62 [0.76] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.45 [0.40] 0.44** [0.17] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.54 [0.97] ‐0.41 [0.50] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.48 [0.27] 0.59 [0.43]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.67 [0.61] ‐0.82 [0.99]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.15 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.10
Number of observations 12,672 13,680 12,240 13,291    10,585 11,545  
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. Cluster adjusted standard errors in 
parentheses.  All models include the baseline micro-variables, income, education and occupational status, and interactive country-wave 
effects (not reported). *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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C.3.  Identical to table 7 in the main paper, only focusing on the 1990 wave including 
another measure of optimism ( " I usually count on being successful in everything I 
do") 
 
Measure of social mobility Level of mobility
(1) Low                   (1)  High    (1) Low                   (1)  High    (1) Low                   (1)  High   
Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err.
Summary measure of persistence in below upper secondary education (Causa et al. 2009)
Conservative ideology ‐0.25 [0.28] ‐0.22 [0.58] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 1 [0.76] 0.6 [1.29] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.18 [0.26] 0.77 [0.42] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.19 [0.72] ‐1.19 [0.91] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.11 [0.29] ‐0.02 [0.52]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.8 [0.78] 0.53 [1.04]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.07 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.10
Number of observations 11,003 7,366 10,541 7,197      9,565 5,971
Summary measure of persistence in tertiary education (Causa et al. 2009)
Conservative ideology ‐0.32 [0.33] ‐0.25 [0.54] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 1.16 [0.93] 0.67 [1.21] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.16 [0.33] 0.81* [0.38] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.13 [0.94] ‐1.23 [0.81] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.12 [0.17] ‐0.13 [0.56]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.17 [0.47] 0.83 [1.14]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09
Number of observations 10,809 7,560 10,345 7,393      9,270 6,266
Intergenerational correlation in educational attainment (Hertz et al. (2007)
Conservative ideology ‐0.32 [0.24] 0.34 [0.29] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 1.25** [0.46] ‐0.44 [0.71] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.06 [0.29] 0.50** [0.20] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.54 [0.69] ‐0.68 [0.63] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.21 [0.26] 0.69** [0.27]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.02 [0.46] ‐1.06 [0.63]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12
Number of observations 10,072 14,478 9,793 14,026    8,969 11,797
Mobility in educational level  (Chevalier 2004)
Conservative ideology ‐0.28 [0.33] 0.42 [0.32] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 1.11 [0.73] ‐0.63 [0.79] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.36 [0.41] 0.38** [0.16] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.34 [0.99] ‐0.28 [0.47] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.42 [0.27] 0.6 [0.40]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.55 [0.59] ‐0.83 [0.93]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.15 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.10
Number of observations 12,672 13,663 12,240 13,273    10,585 11,530  
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. Cluster adjusted standard errors in 
parentheses.  All models include the baseline micro-variables, income, education and occupational status, and interactive country-wave 
effects (not reported). *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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C.4. Identical to table 7 in the main paper, only focusing on employed people. 
 
Measure of social mobility Level of mobility
(1) Low                   (1)  High    (1) Low                   (1)  High    (1) Low                   (1)  High   
Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err.
Summary measure of persistence in below upper secondary education (Causa et al. 2009)
Conservative ideology ‐0.29* [0.15] ‐0.27 [0.45] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 1.07** [0.39] 0.87 [0.98] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.15 [0.28] 0.46 [0.41] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.96 [0.70] ‐0.49 [0.86] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.070 [0.25] 0.08 [0.36]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.59 [0.62] 0.28 [0.75]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.07 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.08
Number of observations 23,281 22,301 12,964 13,407    17,233 13,221
Summary measure of wage persistence, male (Causa et al. 2009)
Conservative ideology ‐0.28 [0.18] ‐0.32 [0.37] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 1.04** [0.44] 0.97 [0.82] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.04 [0.24] 0.51 [0.41] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.64 [0.57] ‐0.59 [0.86] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.21 [0.21] 0.22 [0.36]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.93* [0.51] ‐0.04 [0.77]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.08 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09
Number of observations 25,936 19,646 14,612 11,759    17,581 12,873
Summary measure of wage persistence, female (Causa et al.2009)
Conservative ideology ‐0.2 [0.26] 0.55** [0.21] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 0.92* [0.54] ‐0.64 [0.49] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.48*** [0.10] 0.50*** [0.13] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.52** [0.24] ‐0.63* [0.33] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.06 [0.20] 0.64*** [0.22]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.56 [0.38] ‐0.73 [0.49]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.19 0.27 0.15 0.28 0.15 0.28
Number of observations 58,595 53,217 35,619 35,746    22,291 33,119
Intergenerational income elasticity (Blanden 2013)
Conservative ideology 0.11 [0.33] 0.47 [0.29] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality 0.25 [0.75] ‐0.62 [0.64] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.2 [0.21] 0.57*** [0.12] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.13 [0.49] ‐0.74** [0.28] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.83* [0.40] 0.67* [0.33]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐1.39 [0.88] ‐0.86 [0.76]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.14 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.11
Number of observations 39,671 35,871 29,269 23,070    20,548 23,628  
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. Cluster adjusted standard errors in 
parentheses.  All models include the baseline micro-variables, income, education and occupational status, and interactive country-wave 
effects (not reported). *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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D. Descriptive statistics and results when using measure of potential social mobility (differ 
from actual social mobility) 
D.1. Fairness perception and Income Inequality - low and high mobility in potential 
mobility measures using PISA test scores 
 
Measure of social mobility Level of mobility
(1) Low                  (1) Low                  (1) Low                 
Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err. Coef.    Std. err.
Influence of parental background (Causa and Chapuis 2009)
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality ‐0.64 [0.47] ‐0.41 [0.71] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.39*** [0.08] 0.39 [0.29] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.23 [0.20] ‐0.36 [0.68] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.78*** [0.18] ‐0.22 [0.25]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐1.15*** [0.40] 1.09* [0.60]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.14 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.17
Number of observations 62,290 60,855 40,918 39,432    40,203 30,806
 Educational mobility based on PISA 2003 math scores
Conservative ideology 0.41* [0.24] ‐0.02 [0.28] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality ‐0.28 [0.57] 0.4 [0.61] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.43*** [0.12] 0.21 [0.31] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.41 [0.30] 0.09 [0.66] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.63** [0.26] 0 [0.30]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.8 [0.67] 0.47 [0.66]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.15 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.1
Number of observations 58,364 54,990 39,607 35,262    34,876 30,805
 Educational mobility based on PISA 2003 math scores
Conservative ideology 0.57** [0.23] ‐0.07 [0.23] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Conservative ideology x Income Inequality ‐0.66 [0.53] 0.53 [0.51] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work brings success in the long run ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.46*** [0.10] 0.02 [0.27] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Hard work x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐0.42 [0.28] 0.49 [0.59] ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
People are poor due to laziness, not injustice ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.79*** [0.21] ‐0.15 [0.23]
Laziness x Income Inequality ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐1.19** [0.50] 0.83 [0.52]
Adj. R‐Squared       0.16 0.1 0.14 0.1 0.17 0.09
Number of observations 59,654 53,700 40,229 34,640    35,932 29,749
 (1)  High    (1)  High     (1)  High   
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is life satisfaction measured on a 10-point scale. Cluster adjusted standard errors in 
parentheses.  All models include the baseline micro-variables, income, education and occupational status, and interactive country-wave 
effects (not reported). *, **, *** denote significances at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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D.2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
age  306104 41.40693 16.31288  15 101
age_s  306104 19.80643 15.16092  2.25 102.01
age_3  306104 10.63071 11.88471  0.3375 103.0301
male  306828 0.4790958 0.4995636  0 1
buddhist  306828 0.0176385 0.1316339  0 1
muslim  306828 0.1477994 0.3549016  0 1
catholic  306828 0.3051808 0.4604847  0 1
protestant  306828 0.1400491 0.3470386  0 1
orthodox  306828 0.0944927 0.2925134  0 1
other Christian denomination      306828 0.0167586 0.1283658  0 1
no denomination        306828 0.4252382 0.4943799  0 1
jewish  306828 0.0055895 0.0745535  0 1
hindu  306828 0.0262818 0.1599724  0 1
Age 25 ‐ 34      306104 0.230768 0.4213249  0 1
Age 35 ‐ 44      306104 0.2104448 0.4076252  0 1
Age 45 ‐ 54      306104 0.1582763 0.3650005  0 1
Age 55 ‐ 64      306104 0.1204264 0.32546  0 1
Age > 64       306104 0.1106879 0.3137457  0 1
Income level 2       306828 0.1134479 0.3171401  0 1
Income level 3       306828 0.1275927 0.3336362  0 1
Income level 4       306828 0.1300044 0.3363089  0 1
Income level 5       306828 0.126654 0.3325855  0 1
Income level 6       306828 0.0941994 0.2921063  0 1
Income level 7       306828 0.0753126 0.2638954  0 1
Income level 8       306828 0.0534143 0.2248586  0 1
Income level 9       306828 0.0335823 0.1801518  0 1
Income level 10 (highest)      306828 0.033364 0.1795854  0 1
no income information       306828 0.1227789 0.3281838  0 1
completed primary education      306828 0.1241217 0.3297208  0 1
incomplete sec., techn.       306828 0.0667377 0.2495676  0 1
complete sec., techn.       306828 0.1362555 0.3430602  0 1
incomplete sec., uni prep      306828 0.0796635 0.270772  0 1
complete sec., uni prep      306828 0.1380415 0.3449441  0 1
lower‐level tertiary edu       306828 0.0605584 0.2385188  0 1
upper‐level tertiary edu       306828 0.1157293 0.3199006  0 1
education missing        306828 0.1743224 0.3793871  0 1
single female        306828 0.1073696 0.3095831  0 1
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single male        306828 0.130666 0.3370353  0 1
         306828 0.574136 0.4944741  0 1
cohabiting         306828 0.0541932 0.226399  0 1
has had 1 child      306828 0.1522482 0.3592619  0 1
has had 2 children      306828 0.2589757 0.438073  0 1
has had 3 or morechildren     306828 0.2730976 0.4455513  0 1
selfemployed         306828 0.0921591 0.2892509  0 1
         306828 0.1351409 0.3418745  0 1
         306828 0.1358839 0.3426658  0 1
         306828 0.0162925 0.1265983  0 1
         306828 0.0702283 0.2555317  0 1
unemployed         306828 0.0840699 0.2774931  0 1
service part: > once aweek     291966 0.126912 0.332875  0 1
service part: once a week     291966 0.1834871 0.387066  0 1
service part: one a month     291966 0.1127392 0.3162742  0 1
service part: on common 
holydays    
291966 0.1494558 0.3565378  0 1
service part: on specific 
holydays    
291966 0.0206325 0.142151  0 1
service part: once a year     291966 0.0717275 0.2580367  0 1
service part: less than oncea 
year   
291966 0.1033922 0.3044709  0 1
believes in superior being      306828 0.5632211 0.4959878  0 1
 satisfaction with your life     306828 6.580576 2.478864  1 10
         278134 5.053129 3.001389  1 10
It is important to   eliminate 
income  inequality   
37581 3.862883 1.171264  1 5
It is important to 
guaranteebasic needs   
306828 0.5884046 1.559752  0 5
Hard work brings success in 
the long run  
192385 0.5444915 0.4980179  0 1
People are poor due 
tolaziness, not injustice  
143516 0.3706625 0.4829839  0 1
People have chance to 
escapepoverty    
64826 0.3946565 0.4887805  0 1
Conservative ideology        306828 0.2245134 0.4172622  0 1
Gross Gini Coefficient (Solt 
database) 
298091 0.4345216 0.0835173  0.2651189 0.6995371
Intergenerational earnings 
elasticity (d'Addio 2007)    
60770 0.6810724 0.1169182  0.5 0.85
Summary measure of wage 
persistence,male (Causa et al. 
50005 0.6030958 0.1626056  0.331 0.95
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Summary measure of wage 
persistence,female (Causa et 
al. 2009) 
50005 0.6120133 0.2243545  0.285 1.261
Summary measure of 
persistence intertiary 
education (Causa et al. 2009)   
50005 0.5457586 0.0968302  0.328 0.753
Summary measure of 
persistence intertiary 
education (Causa et al. 2009)   
50005 0.5769749 0.1114237  0.3380001 0.869
Summary measure of 
persistence inbelow upper 
secondary education (Causa et 
al. 2009)  
50005 0.7289702 0.1605522  0.392 0.924
Summary measure of 
persistence inbelow upper 
secondary education (Causa et 
al. 2009)  
50005 0.7351988 0.16285  0.464 0.943
Intergenerational correlation 
in educational attainment  
(Hertz et al. (2007)  
130001 0.553552 0.1006371  0.34 0.9
Intergenerational income 
elasticity (Blanden 2013)    
56280 0.7028111 0.0940775  0.48 0.86
Mobility in educational level 
(Chevalier2004)    
83027 10.357 6.232013  1 20
Educational mobility based on 
PISA2003 math scores  
116050 76.62953 18.72776  42.26 120.14
Educational mobility based on 
PISA2003 math scores  
116050 71.92443 20.73705  36.09 111.26
Influence of parental 
background (Causa and 
Chapuis 2009)  
127108 0.6071744 0.0823044  0.46 0.75
 I am good atgetting what I 
want 
52501 0.4748671 0.4993727  0 1
 I usually count onbeing 
successful in everything I do 
52484 0.348068 0.4763622  0 1
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D.3.  List of countries included in each regression 
 
Number Regression Number Regression Number Regression Number Regression
1 2.1 2 2.2 3 2.3 4 2.4
5 3.1 6 3.2 7 3.3 8 3.4
9 4.1.1 ‐ 4.1.2 ‐ 4.1.3
10 4.2.1 11 4.2.2. 12 4.2.3
13 4.3.1 ‐ 4.3.2 ‐ 4.3.3
14 4.4.1. 15 4.4.2 16 4.4.3
17 5.1 18 5.2 19 5.3
20 6.1.1 21 6.1.2 22 6.1.3
23 6.2.1 24 6.2.2 25 6.2.3
26 6.3.1 27 6.3.2 28 6.3.3
29 6.4.1 30 6.4.2 31 6.4.3
32 7.1.1 33 7.1.2 34 7.1.3
35 7.2.1 36 7.2.2 37 7.2.3
38 7.3.1 39 7.3.2 40 7.3.3
41 7.4.1 42 7.4.2 43 7.4.3
Below a table with the individual countries included in each regression, number refer to the first row 
in the table.
C o u n t r y 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5 2 6 2 7 2 8 2 9 3 0 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 4 3 5 3 6 3 7 3 8 3 9 4 0 4 1 4 2 4 3
A l b a n i a   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
A l g e r i a   ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
A n d o r r a   X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
A r g e n t i n a   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
A rm e n i a   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
A u s t r a l i a   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
A u s t r i a   X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X X X X ‐ X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
A z e r b a i j a n   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
B a n g l a d e s h   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐
B e l a r u s   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
B e l g i u m   X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X X X X ‐ X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X X X X X X X
B o s n i a  a n d  H e r z e g o v X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
B r a z i l   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐
B u l g a r i a   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
B u r k i n a  F a s o   X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
C a n a d a   X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X
C h i l e   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X
C o l o m b i a   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐
C r o a t i a   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
C y p r u s   X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
C z e c h  R e p u b l i c   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X
D e n m a r k   X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X X X X ‐ X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
D o m i n i c a n  R e p u b l i c   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
E g y p t   X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐
E l  S a l v a d o r   X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
E s t o n i a   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐
E t h i o p i a  ( n e w )   X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐
F i n l a n d   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
F r a n c e   X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X X X X ‐ X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
G e o r g i a   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
G e rm a n y   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X
G h a n a   X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐
G re e c e   ‐ X ‐ X ‐ X ‐ X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
G u a t e m a l a   ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
H o n g  K o n g  S p e c i a l  A d ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
H u n g a r y   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X
I c e l a n d   X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X X X X ‐ X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
I n d i a   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
I n d o n e s i a   X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐
I r a q   ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
I r e l a n d   X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X X X X ‐ X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X X X X X X X
I s r a e l   ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
I t a l y   X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X X X X ‐ X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
J a p a n   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
J o r d a n   X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
K y r g y z s t a n   ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐
L a t v i a   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
L i t h u a n i a   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
L u x e m b o u r g   ‐ X ‐ X ‐ X ‐ X ‐ X X X ‐ X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
M a c e d o n i a   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐  
23 
 
Malays ia   ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Mali   X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Malta   X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Me x ico   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Morocco   ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
N e the rland s   X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X X X X ‐ X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X X X X X X X
N ew  Ze aland   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X
N ige ria   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
N orw ay   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X
Pak istan   ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐
Pe ru   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐
Ph i l ip p ine s   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐
Po land   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X
Po rtu ga l   X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X X X X ‐ X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Pue rto  R ico   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Re pub l ic  o f  Kore a   X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Re pub l ic  o f  Moldova   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Rom an ia   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Ru ss ian  Fe de ration   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Rw anda   X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Saud i  A rab ia   ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Se rb ia   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
S in gapo re   ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
S lo vak ia   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐
S lo ve n ia   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X
Sou th  A frica   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐
Spain   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Sw e de n   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Sw itze rland   X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ X
Taiw an   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Thai land   X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Trin id ad  and  Tobago   X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Tu rke y   X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Uganda   ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Ukra ine   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐
Un ite d  K in gdom  o f  G X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X X X X ‐ X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Un ite d  Re pub l ic  o f  Ta ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Un ite d  State s  o f  Am e X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X X X X X X
Uruguay   X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
V e ne zue la  (Bo l iv aria X X X X X X X X X X ‐ X X X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Zam b ia   X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Z im babw e   ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ X ‐ X ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐  
